Houthis Turn to Chinese Parts for a Homegrown Kheibar Shekan Missile

October 14, 2026 — Yemen’s Houthis imported custom-made metal missile parts from a Chinese supplier in an effort to build their own version of Iran’s Kheibar Shekan medium-range ballistic missile, according to a new report by Conflict Armament Research (CAR) that The Wall Street Journal described on October 13. A locally built version would have a range of up to about 1,200 miles, enough to reach all of Saudi Arabia and Israel, the Journal reported.

The finding lands as the Houthis are again firing missiles at Saudi Arabia. The Jerusalem Post noted that Yemen’s war resumed as a spillover of the U.S.-Iran war that began with the U.S.-Israeli attack on Iran on February 28.

What Yemeni authorities seized

According to the Journal’s account, Yemeni authorities interdicted two shipments in 2025 in which the parts were hidden among other goods, and they passed the details to CAR in July. The cargo included parts of a solid-propellant rocket motor and airframe sections from a Kheibar Shekan-series missile, the fins that stabilize it in flight, tools, testing equipment and raw materials. Among those materials was ablative heat shielding, which protects a ballistic missile from the heat of its flight. Shipping documents identified a Chinese precision-metal producer that the report did not name, i24NEWS reported.

Some of the items could have civilian uses, the Journal noted, but others were designed specifically for missile production. CAR senior analyst Fabian Hinz told the paper: “When you have imports like that, there is a possibility that they are already manufacturing or that they are trying and it doesn’t really work out.” He added that Houthi weapons facilities are so well camouflaged that it is unclear how far production has advanced. CAR had not posted the new report on its website when this article was published, so the details above rely on the Journal’s reporting as relayed by The Jerusalem Post and i24NEWS.

China says it is respecting the UN arms embargo on the Houthis, according to the Journal. The Foreign Ministry’s October 14 briefing transcript contains no question or answer on the report. Two days earlier, after a Houthi strike on Riyadh’s airport, spokesperson Mao Ning said: “China condemns the attacks, which caused significant casualties, and expresses grave concern over the escalating conflict.”

From Iranian kits to Chinese machining

CAR’s earlier work shows why the new finding stands out. Its report “Powering the Houthis,” published May 1, examined materiel from interdictions between August 2024 and June 2025. The biggest was the June 25, 2025 seizure of the Al Sherwa dhow by the National Resistance Force, a Yemeni coalition based in the Red Sea port of Mokha; U.S. Central Command called it the largest in the force’s history. CAR documented more than 800 missile and drone components from that one cargo, bearing the brands of companies in at least 16 countries and territories. Only 5 percent could be linked to Iranian production.

That May report found that the missiles “were not supplied in assembled form.” They arrived as packaged components labeled with codes showing which parts belonged to which missile, which CAR said implied that Houthi domestic production was limited and that the group relied on outside supply. The October findings point in another direction: structural metal and motor sections, among the hardest parts of a ballistic missile to make, ordered from a Chinese manufacturer rather than delivered inside an Iranian kit.

Timeline: the China thread in Houthi procurement

The dated record below is compiled from UN, U.S. Treasury and CAR documents and from the Journal’s reporting.

Compiled by Peter’s World from UN Security Council Resolution 2216, U.S. Treasury press releases (Oct. 2, 2024 and Sept. 11, 2025), Conflict Armament Research’s May 2026 report and The Wall Street Journal’s Oct. 13, 2026 reporting.

What the UN embargo covers

UN Security Council Resolution 2216, adopted in April 2015 with Russia abstaining, demands that the Houthis “refrain from any provocation or threats to neighbouring States, including through acquiring surface-surface missiles.” Its arms embargo is targeted rather than country-wide. It bars supplies to named individuals and entities and to “those acting on their behalf or at their direction,” and it explicitly covers “spare parts” and technical assistance.

That structure matters for a case like this one. Machined metal parts can be shipped as industrial goods, so a breach depends on proving who ordered them and for what end use. That is why physical documentation of seized cargo, the kind CAR produces, carries weight with sanctions investigators.

Washington has used its own tools against Chinese links to the Houthi weapons chain. In September 2025, Treasury said one China-based firm, Shanxi Shutong, had shipped chemical precursors destined for the Houthis, “including chemicals that Houthi operatives use to manufacture motors for ballistic missiles and explosives.” A year earlier, it said Shenzhen Rion had sent “hundreds of advanced components for use in the manufacturing of missile guidance systems.”

Why it matters

This section is Peter’s World analysis based on the sources cited in this article.

Taken together, the public record shows a supply chain moving from finished Iranian weapons toward parts the Houthis assemble themselves. Treasury’s 2025 findings described chemicals for missile motors. The new report describes machined motor and airframe sections. Neither proves that a working production line exists, and Hinz’s own caution is the right baseline. But if the effort succeeds, the Houthis would hold a solid-fuel missile that can be stored fueled and launched quickly from trucks, which, as military experts told the Journal in July, makes the Kheibar Shekan harder to find and destroy before launch than older liquid-fuel designs.

That shift would weaken the tool that has worked best so far: stopping dhows at sea. Iranian kits travel on smuggling routes that navies watch. Commercial orders for metal parts travel with ordinary paperwork through regular freight channels, so enforcement moves from warships to customs offices, export-control agencies and sanctions lists.

It also puts Beijing’s stated position to a practical test. China publicly condemned the Houthi strike on Riyadh and says it observes the UN embargo. Whether Chinese authorities act against the unnamed producer will show how far that position extends to its own exporters. Further signals to watch include CAR’s full publication, any new Treasury designations and statements from Saudi Arabia and Israel, the two countries the Journal said would sit within range.

Sources

• The Wall Street Journal: The Houthis Are Building an Advanced Missile With Chinese Parts
• Conflict Armament Research: Powering the Houthis — Analysing Houthi Missile Components
• U.S. Treasury: Treasury Sanctions Houthi Illicit Revenue and Procurement Networks (Sept. 11, 2025)
• China Foreign Ministry: Mao Ning regular press conference, Oct. 12, 2026 (embassy transcript)
• The Jerusalem Post: Houthis developing new version of Iranian ballistic missile using Chinese parts

Related coverage

• Middle East War Update — October 14, 2026
• Bab al-Mandab Fight: Who Holds Perim Island and Why It Matters
• September 2026 Roundup: Iran, the Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz