IRGC, Iranian Opinion and Reza Pahlavi’s Transition Plan

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps now sits at the center of a war, a blockade and a succession. Its commander-in-chief, Ahmad Vahidi, called the Strait of Hormuz a “red line” in a public warning on October 8.¹ This report tests six claims about the IRGC, Iranian society and the opposition against documents, surveys and named assessments. Where the evidence supports a claim, it says so. Where it does not, it says what the evidence shows instead. One finding up front: no source we found reports a poll asking Iranians whether the IRGC should be removed, so no such figure appears here.

Key takeaways

“Closer than ever to being overthrown” is contested, not established. Reza Pahlavi told Reuters in July that the government is “very close” to collapse.² U.S. intelligence found no imminent collapse in March, Reuters reported, and Crisis Group’s Ali Vaez told POLITICO that Iran’s leaders “either sink together or survive together.”³⁴
No verified count of closed mosques exists. The widely shared “50,000 closed” figure comes from a 2023 remark by a cleric who later said it was misused.⁵⁶ The best documented numbers are 6,685 “inactive” mosques out of 54,770 evaluated in 2021, and an official’s acknowledgment that more than 16,000 are almost or completely inactive.⁷⁸
The repression is documented, with counts that vary by monitor. HRANA recorded at least 2,003 executions between October 10, 2025 and October 8, 2026.⁹ A UN fact-finding mission said the scale of killing during the January protests was “staggering” but that it could not give precise totals.¹⁰
The best recent survey shows broad hostility to the government, not a vote on the IRGC. GAMAAN found 47% prefer regime change and 13% prefer the Islamic Republic. It did not publish a question on the IRGC.¹¹
Pahlavi’s plan is a written transition roadmap. It names him “Leader of the National Uprising,” dissolves the IRGC, and promises a referendum on the system of government within four months. Critics doubt he would follow it, and he says he is “not running for office.”¹²²
Iranian views of U.S. and Israeli action are split. GAMAAN found 38% backed foreign military intervention before and after the war and 27% opposed it both times.¹¹ University of Maryland pollsters argue there is no broad constituency for regime change by bombing.¹³

What is confirmed, what is reported, what is assessment

“Confirmed” means a primary document or official source says it. “Documented” means a monitor or outlet reports it with stated methods. “Assessment” means an analyst’s or official’s judgment, or Peter’s World analysis, and is labeled that way.

Confirmed on the record

The text of Pahlavi’s written transition plan, including its referendum and IRGC provisions.¹²
The official January protest death toll announced by the Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans, as recorded by the UN mission.¹⁰
The Guidance Foundation’s 2021 activity ratings of Iran’s mosques.⁷
Secretary Rubio’s October 7 remarks called Iran’s leaders “radical mullahs” and described a “cult of death.” The speech did not mention Pahlavi or removing the IRGC.¹⁴

Documented by monitors and outlets

Execution counts from HRANA and Iran Human Rights, which cover different periods.⁹¹⁵
A January protest death estimate from an unnamed “credible human rights organization” cited by the UN mission.¹⁰
GAMAAN’s online survey of people inside Iran, fielded in June 2026.¹⁶
Pahlavi’s rivals and supporters clash, and some opposition groups question his plan (Reuters).²

Assessment and contested

Whether the IRGC is near collapse: Pahlavi says yes; U.S. intelligence, Stimson and Crisis Group analysts say not imminently.²³¹⁷⁴
Whether most Iranians want the IRGC removed: no direct poll found.
Whether Iranians “welcome” U.S. and Israeli action: survey data show division.¹¹
Peter’s World analysis section below: labeled as our interpretation.

Timeline: from the December protests to this week

Each entry is attributed to the source that reports it. Casualty figures are the source’s own.

Dec. 28, 2025
Protests begin and spread nationwide, according to the UN fact-finding mission.¹⁰
Jan. 8, 2026
The government imposes a total internet, mobile and landline shutdown. The UN mission says credible reports indicate violence and deaths escalated shortly after. It cites reports that IRGC and Basij forces deployed to protest sites that night.¹⁰
Jan. 17–21
The then Supreme Leader acknowledged that “thousands of people” had been killed. The Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans announced an official toll that includes security forces and 690 “rioters.”¹⁰
Jan. 2026
The European Union designates the IRGC a terrorist organization; the United States did so in 2019, Reuters notes.²
Feb. 28
U.S. and Israeli strikes begin and kill Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Reuters reports.³
Apr. 7
HRANA publishes its tally for the war’s first 39 days, split into civilian, military and unclassified deaths.¹⁸
Jun. 14
The United States announces a memorandum of understanding with Iran. Reuters says it made no mention of regime change.² POLITICO later called it “now-defunct.”⁴
Jun. 20–27
GAMAAN fields its survey inside Iran.¹⁶
Aug. 24
Washington launches “Operation Economic Outcast,” widening sanctions on firms operating in Iran’s technology, gold, aviation and shipping sectors.¹⁹
Oct. 7
Rubio gives the Athens speech.¹⁴
Oct. 8–9
Trump says the United States will not attack Iran before the November 3 midterms while the blockade stays.¹⁹ HRANA publishes its annual execution report.⁹

Is the IRGC closer than ever to being overthrown?

No source we found makes that claim in those words with evidence. What exists is a set of attributed assessments that disagree. Pahlavi told Reuters in two July interviews that Iran’s current government is “very close” to collapse.² Separately, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said on October 8 that the U.S. “absolute isolation campaign” is “working.” Iran International reported the rial near 2.7 million to the dollar that week.¹⁹

Other named voices see durability. Reuters reported in March that three sources familiar with U.S. intelligence said a “multitude” of reports found the leadership “not in danger” of collapse.³ Robert Ford, a former U.S. ambassador to Syria writing for the Stimson Center, argued that with loyal security forces, “a fierce but brittle regime can hang on for a long time” without a unified national opposition inside the country.¹⁷ Ali Vaez of the International Crisis Group said Iran’s leaders “either sink together or survive together.” Behnam Ben Taleblu of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a hawkish think tank, said time may matter: outside pressure could spark defections or dysfunction, which he called “in short, a death spiral.”⁴

A U.S. official told POLITICO there is “no public sign yet of unprecedented or destabilizing regime splits or fractures,” and the same article says the IRGC “has significant sway.”⁴ Reuters wrote that the government has survived the onslaught and, “in the view of many Iran watchers, has tightened its hold on power.”²

Peter’s World analysis

The claim that the IRGC is closer than ever to being overthrown rests on pressure indicators: the economy, the January protests, GAMAAN’s regime-change figure, and the insurgency in Sistan and Baluchestan reported by Iran International. The counter-evidence is the factor Ford highlights, loyal security forces, and no source we found reports significant defections. None of these sources compares today with earlier crises, such as the 2022 protests, on a common measure, so “closer than ever” cannot be confirmed. Peter’s World’s reading is that the cited record shows heavy strain but not yet the breakdowns analysts say come before collapse.

How many mosques have closed in Iran?

No verified number exists. The figure most often repeated, 50,000, traces to Mohammad Abolghassem Doulabi, who served as the Raisi government’s liaison to the seminaries. Iran International reported in 2023 that he said around 50,000 of 75,000 mosques were closed.⁵ Doulabi then said his words were misused. Quoting Hawzah News, the fact-checker DFRAC reports that he attributed closed doors to missing full-time imams, weak supervision and funding, not falling religiosity, and said “thousands” of mosques are closed.⁶ We could not open the Hawzah original.

The most reliable figures describe activity, not closure:

Mosque activity figures from Iranian institutions, with the body that reported each.
Figure	Source and date	What it says
54,770 mosques evaluated	Guidance Foundation, 2021, via Iran Open Data⁷	2,766 highly active; 19,524 active; 16,006 relatively active; 9,789 weak; 6,685 inactive. The criteria are not published.
85,000 mosques	Reza Moamami-Moghaddam of the Endowment and Charity Affairs Organization, as reported by Iran International⁸	About 2,750 highly active, about 20,000 with regular activities, more than 16,000 almost or completely inactive.
More than 75,000 registered	Mohammad Javad Haj Ali-Akbari, head of the Friday Imams Policy-Making Council, Oct. 1, 2026, via IQNA²⁰	A new central database lists them; 10,000 are being readied for social and relief work.

Officials have acknowledged a problem. Culture Minister Mohammad Mehdi Esmaili called the statistics on active mosques “highly alarming” in December 2023.²¹ Survey data point the same way, with a caution. In GAMAAN’s 2026 survey, 22.2% called religion “very important” in their lives, against 69.4% in the World Values Survey of 2020. GAMAAN itself treats religion as a sensitive question, and the two surveys used different methods.¹⁶

How repressive is the government? The documented record

Monitors and UN bodies describe a state that has expanded executions, cut communications and detained large numbers. Their counts differ by period and method, so the figures below are not added together.

Execution counts from three sources. The periods differ, so the figures are not directly comparable.
Monitor	Period	Count	Notes
HRANA	Oct. 10, 2025 to Oct. 8, 2026⁹	At least 2,003	Up about 29% from 1,553. About 95% were not announced officially. 69 were political or security cases, 35 of them tied to the January protests.
Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO) and ECPM	Calendar 2025¹⁵	At least 1,639	Up 68% from 975 in 2024. At least 48 women executed; 795 for drug offenses.
Abdorrahman Boroumand Center, cited by HRW	Calendar 2025²²	More than 2,000	HRW calls it the highest number of known executions since the late 1980s.

HRANA’s breakdown matters for how the figure is read. Murder (57.56%) and drug offenses (36.25%) account for more than 93% of the executions it recorded, and rights groups say many followed trials that did not meet fair-trial standards.⁹²² HRW also reports that President Pezeshkian signed a law on October 15, 2025 widening the death penalty for vaguely worded national security charges.²²

On the January protests, the UN mission’s report says the government shut down communications on January 8 and that casualties were on a “staggering scale.” It could not give precise estimates, citing the blackout and Iran’s refusal of access. It cites an estimate of more than 7,000 killed, including up to 6,500 protesters and more than 230 children, from an unnamed rights organization. The Foundation of Martyrs and Veterans announced on January 21 that 3,117 people had been killed, including security forces, and 690 “rioters.”¹⁰ An Iranian official told Reuters that at least 5,000 had died, while Pahlavi puts the toll at 40,000. Reuters reports both as the speakers’ own claims.² The mission also records that the FARAJA special-forces commander said police “did not use any firearms against the protestors.”¹⁰ A credible rights group cited by the mission estimated that more than 50,000 people had been arrested by mid-February, and the judiciary said on February 17 that it had referred 10,538 for prosecution.¹⁰

Amnesty’s 2025 report says compulsory veiling was enforced, trials were “systematically unfair,” and authorities carried out flogging and amputation.²³ HRW reports that the UN mission concluded in March 2025 that authorities continued to commit crimes against humanity in connection with the 2022 protests that followed the death of Mahsa Amini in custody.²²

What Iranians say in surveys: the IRGC, the system and Pahlavi

GAMAAN, a Netherlands-registered nonprofit, ran the most recent large survey. It says it had no commissioner and ran the study independently.¹⁶ It collected responses online from June 20 to 27, 2026, through the Psiphon, Lantern and MahsaNet circumvention tools. The weighted sample was 31,450 people inside Iran, with an effective size of about 6,211, a credibility interval of about 3 points and a target population of literate residents aged 15 and over.¹⁶

Selected GAMAAN findings, June 2026.
Question	Result	Note
Preferred political orientation	47% regime change; 23% structural transition; 10% reform within the Islamic Republic; 9% principles of the Revolution and Leader¹¹	Regime change up about 5 points on the prior year.
Preferred system	34% monarchy (25% non-federal, 9% federal); 28% republic; 13% Islamic Republic¹¹	About a quarter said the form did not matter or lacked information.
View of Reza Pahlavi	45% positive before and after the protests and war; 28% negative both times¹¹	About a 4-point decline in positive views. Reuters quoted GAMAAN’s director as saying about 48% view him favorably.²
Foreign military intervention	38% supported before and after; 27% opposed both times; 8% moved to oppose; 4% moved to support¹¹	As a method for change, 30% called it effective; 44% chose civil protest.
The 39-day U.S.-Israeli war	42% called it “military aggression”; about 40% called it “humanitarian intervention,” and about 48% disagreed¹¹	60% felt satisfaction at the Islamic Republic’s weakening.

Three limits apply. The survey is a non-probability online sample of people who can use circumvention tools, and 25% declined to say whether they joined the protests.¹⁶ Fear can suppress candid answers, and GAMAAN’s own religion check showed a gap against the World Values Survey.¹⁶ And it did not publish a question on the IRGC or on Pahlavi as interim leader, so “a large majority want the IRGC removed” and “Pahlavi is the clear preference as interim leader” are not figures from this survey. A preference for monarchy among 34% is not the same as backing Pahlavi to lead a transition.

Pollsters at the University of Maryland’s CISSM use a different method. With the Toronto firm IranPoll, they run random-digit-dial telephone surveys of about 1,000 people per wave and have fielded 22 surveys since 2014.²⁴ They argue that opt-in surveys, such as those drawn from a single VPN provider’s users, capture a subset of the population. Their pooled analysis of 15 polls from 2014 to 2024 found the share of Iranians favorable to the United States fell from 26.5% to roughly 14% after the U.S. left the 2015 nuclear deal in 2018, and that this group favors diplomacy more than other Iranians do.¹³ They also report that a survey fielded soon after the June 2025 war showed signs of a rally-around-the-flag effect. Their pooled data predate the 2026 protests and war.¹³²⁴

A third data point shows how unreliable open polls can be. Iran International reported that 68% of more than 56,000 respondents to its October 8 Instagram poll said U.S. pressure hurts ordinary Iranians more than the authorities. About 76% of respondents were men.¹ An Instagram poll is open to whoever sees it, so it is a self-selected audience, not a representative sample (Peter’s World assessment).

Reza Pahlavi’s plan, from his own document

The roadmap is the Iran Prosperity Project’s Emergency Phase booklet, which carries a foreword signed by Pahlavi and covers the first 180 days after the Islamic Republic falls. The project director is Saeed Ghasseminejad.¹² Its main provisions:

Role: Pahlavi, as “Leader of the National Uprising,” issues a decree abolishing the Islamic Republic’s constitution and creating a Transitional Mehestan, Transitional Government and Transitional Divan. He serves as commander-in-chief of the armed forces during the transition.¹²
IRGC: the decree dissolves the IRGC and its affiliated entities, integrates its armed wing into the national army, moves its economic and cultural wings to the transitional government, and places its intelligence wing under a new National Intelligence and Security Service. Vetted former members could be integrated gradually.¹²
Votes: within four months, a referendum on a parliamentary monarchy or a republic. Within two months of the result, an election for a Constituent Assembly, which has six months to draft a constitution. A constitutional referendum follows within one month, then elections for the Mehestan.¹²
Timeline: 18 to 24 months overall. An extension of more than six months needs the heads of all three transitional institutions and the Leader’s approval. An extension beyond 12 months needs a national referendum.¹²
Coalition terms: parties must accept Iran’s territorial integrity, a secular democracy, individual freedoms, and the people’s right to choose a system.¹²

Pahlavi told Reuters: “I’m not the destination, I’m a bridge to the destination.” Asked whether he would rule out becoming monarch if Iranians voted for a constitutional monarchy, he said: “I am not running for office,” and that it also depends on “what it is that best serves the country’s purpose.”²

Criticism comes from several directions. Reuters reports that some opposition groups, citing the shah’s legacy, question whether he would follow his stated plan. It reports that Trump said in January that Pahlavi “seems very nice, but I don’t know how he’d play within his own country,” and that Vice President JD Vance said Trump “never said that his goal was to install Reza Pahlavi.” Reuters also documented violence or harassment by self-identified Pahlavi supporters in three countries, said there is no evidence Pahlavi was involved, and quotes him saying “I condemn it.”² Ford noted in March that five Iranian Kurdish parties had formed a coalition shortly before the war.¹⁷ Reuters says Pahlavi does not appear to have a mass organized movement inside Iran. He told Reuters it is “not true” that he lacks one, and said he is in contact with “cell leaders” of “over a thousand different groupings.” Reuters could not confirm how many.²

Do Iranians welcome U.S. and Israeli action against the IRGC?

The documented answer is divided. In GAMAAN’s data, the group that backed foreign military intervention throughout is larger than the group that opposed it throughout, but neither is a majority, and many respondents changed their view or did not say. A majority also reported satisfaction at the government’s weakening, and 52% said they were not saddened by the Supreme Leader’s killing.¹¹ The same survey found 66% opposed the slogan “No compromise, no surrender; fight the United States” and 62% opposed “Death to Israel.” Views of leaders were split: Trump 44% positive and 44% negative, Netanyahu 51% positive and 38% negative.¹¹

The counter-evidence is also on the record. HRANA’s tally counts at least 1,701 civilians killed in the war’s 39 days.¹⁸ CISSM’s authors write that Iranian discontent “is not America’s to command” and that their data show no significant constituency for coercion or “liberation by bombing.”¹³ Amnesty reported that Israel’s June 2025 strikes killed more than 1,100 people, including 45 children.²³ U.S. statements point in more than one direction. CISSM’s authors recall that Trump told Iranians to “take over your government” after the Supreme Leader was killed.¹³ Bessent urged ordinary Iranian soldiers to “ask whether your commanders are leading your country to triumph or to ruin.”⁴ Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said on October 8 that Washington is not seeking to “nation build” in Iran.¹ Rubio’s Athens speech did not mention removing the IRGC.¹⁴

Peter’s World analysis

Peter’s World’s reading: the evidence supports a narrower statement than “Iranians welcome the United States and Israel.” Inside Iran, hostility to the government is widespread in the best available survey, and a sizable minority supports outside military pressure. But the same data show division over whether the 2026 war was aggression or intervention, and independent pollsters dispute how far opposition to the government translates into support for foreign force. American audiences who assume Iranians are united in either direction are missing that split. That is a judgment about the evidence cited, not a poll result.

Analysis: what the evidence supports, through the Seven Lenses

This section is Peter’s World analysis based on the sources cited above. Forecasts are judgments, not facts.

Analysis

Using the Seven Lenses framework, the strongest evidence sits in Lens 6, domestic politics and information, and Lens 7, strategic leverage. The government’s capacity to coerce is documented: record executions, a total communications blackout and arrests that one rights group put above 50,000. Its legitimacy is also measurably low in the best available survey. Those two facts can coexist for a long time, which is why Ford’s indicators center on security-force loyalty and Vaez stresses elite unity. Peter’s World’s judgment is that this reading is the best supported by the cited sources.

Lens 4, economics, is where the pressure is most visible: the rial near 2.7 million to the dollar and Kpler’s warning, cited by Iran International, that oil revenue could fall to zero by mid-December if the blockade holds. Lens 3, alliances, shows the other side of the pressure: Bessent says Washington is working with the UAE and Oman, and with Pakistan and Turkey “to cut off all the land routes.” Pahlavi’s plan addresses Lens 2 directly by proposing to dissolve the IRGC and fold its armed wing into the army, but it assumes the Islamic Republic has already fallen, so it says little about how that happens.

Our judgment is that three questions would change this assessment: a visible split among IRGC commanders or units, loss of control of a major city, or a poll that asks directly about the IRGC and about a transitional leader. Until one of those appears, claims that the Guards are about to fall, and claims that Iranians are united behind a single successor, both go beyond the evidence. For the intelligence side of the IRGC, see our intelligence agencies explainer and IRGC Explained.

What to watch

November 3. Trump’s stated pause on strikes runs to the U.S. midterms, with the blockade still in place.¹⁹
Security-force cohesion. Ford’s indicators are defections, units refusing to confront protesters, and loss of control of cities.¹⁷
New polling. A probability sample, or a GAMAAN question on the IRGC and a transitional leader, would fill the biggest gap in the record.
Execution data. HRANA’s counts rose again in the year to October 8; its political and security category peaked in April and May.⁹
Opposition unity. Whether Kurdish and other groups accept the Iran Prosperity Project’s four coalition principles.¹²¹⁷

Frequently asked questions

Has the IRGC been overthrown or is it about to be?

No. It remains in power. Analysts disagree on the outlook: Pahlavi says the government is “very close” to collapse, while U.S. intelligence found no imminent collapse in March and Crisis Group’s Ali Vaez told POLITICO its leaders will sink or survive together.²³⁴

How many mosques have closed in Iran?

There is no verified number. A 2023 claim of 50,000 closed was later disputed by the cleric who made it. Iranian institutions’ own ratings show thousands of mosques inactive, which is a different measure.⁶⁷

How many people has Iran executed recently?

HRANA documented its highest annual total in ten reporting periods for the year to October 8, 2026, and Iran Human Rights recorded a post-1989 high for 2025. The periods and methods differ, so the counts are not added together.⁹¹⁵

Do polls show most Iranians want the IRGC removed?

We found no published poll that asks that. GAMAAN’s June 2026 survey found regime change was the most common preference, but it does not report an IRGC question.¹¹

What is Reza Pahlavi’s plan for Iran?

His Iran Prosperity Project calls for a transitional system led by him as “Leader of the National Uprising,” dissolution of the IRGC, a referendum on monarchy or republic, and a constituent assembly to draft a constitution.¹²

What did GAMAAN find about Pahlavi?

About 45% said their view of him was positive before and after the protests and war, and 28% said it was negative both times.¹¹

Sources and footnotes

24 sources, numbered in order of first use. U.N. and official records come first, then rights monitors, think tanks, pollsters and news outlets. Last reviewed October 11, 2026.

Iran International live page, Oct. 8–10 (Hegseth and Vahidi remarks, Instagram poll) Iran International, Oct. 10, 2026 ↩ ↩ ↩
Regime change? Inside Reza Pahlavi’s faltering bid to lead Iran (Reuters investigation, republished) Reuters via The Times of Israel, Jul. 29, 2026 (site blocks scripts; opened through a fetch tool) ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
U.S. intelligence says Iran government is not at risk of collapse, say sources Reuters, Mar. 11, 2026 (page blocks scripts; text read through a search excerpt) ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
The Iranian Regime’s Dynamics Are Fooling Trump POLITICO (Nahal Toosi), Sept. 2, 2026 (site blocks scripts; opened through a fetch tool) ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
Senior Cleric Claims Religion In Iran Weak, 50,000 Mosques Closed Iran International, Jun. 2, 2023 ↩ ↩
50,000 mosques closed in Iran due to the decreasing interest in Islam? Read fact-check DFRAC, Jun. 7, 2023 ↩ ↩ ↩
Iran Has at Least 55 Times More Mosques Than Hospitals, Provincial Data Shows Iran Open Data, Nov. 13, 2023 (full article behind a sign-in wall) ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
The politics of prayer: who controls Iran’s mosques and Friday sermons Iran International, Oct. 18, 2025 ↩ ↩

Show 16 more sources

Annual Report on Execution in Iran; Marking the World Day Against the Death Penalty HRANA (Human Rights Activists News Agency), Oct. 9, 2026 ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
Report of the independent international fact-finding mission on the Islamic Republic of Iran (A/HRC/61/60, advance unedited version) UN Human Rights Council, Mar. 10, 2026 ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
Iranians’ Attitudes Toward the 2026 Protests and War (survey page) GAMAAN, Jul. 27, 2026 ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
Iran Prosperity Project: Emergency Phase Booklet Iran Prosperity Project (foreword by Reza Pahlavi), current edition ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
Trump’s regime change fantasies never stood a chance Responsible Statecraft (CISSM authors), Apr. 21, 2026 ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
Secretary of State Marco Rubio Remarks (The Pnyx, Athens) U.S. State Department, Oct. 7, 2026 ↩ ↩ ↩
2025 Annual Report on the Death Penalty in Iran Iran Human Rights (IHRNGO) and ECPM, Apr. 13, 2026 ↩ ↩ ↩
GAMAAN 2026 Protests and War Survey Report (English PDF, with methodology) GAMAAN, Jul. 2026 ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
What Would Be Indicators of Regime Collapse in Iran? Stimson Center (Robert Ford), Mar. 5, 2026 (site blocks scripts; opened through a fetch tool) ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
Day 39 of U.S. and Israeli Attacks on Iran HRANA, Apr. 7, 2026 ↩ ↩
‘Absolute isolation’: US outlines plan to cut off Iran’s economic lifelines Iran International, Oct. 10, 2026 ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
ساماندهی ۱۰ هزار مسجد برای کنشگری اجتماعی و امداد (Organizing 10,000 mosques for social action and relief; Persian) IQNA (Iranian state-run Quran news agency), Oct. 1, 2026 ↩
Fall In Mosque-Goers In Iran Now ‘Highly Alarming’ – Minister Iran International, Dec. 12, 2023 ↩
World Report 2026: Iran Human Rights Watch, 2026 ↩ ↩ ↩ ↩
Human rights in Iran: Iran 2025 Amnesty International, 2026 ↩ ↩
Methodological note to “Trump’s Regime Change Fantasies Never Stood a Chance” University of Maryland CISSM, May 2026 ↩ ↩

Additional sources

Five more links with extra detail

HRW World Report 2026: Iran: chapter on arbitrary detention, the Evin prison strike and minority executions
Amnesty International: Iran 2025: IHL violations in the June 2025 war and internal repression
Iran Human Rights: 2025 annual report: breakdown by charge, women and foreign nationals
University of Maryland CISSM methodological note: IranPoll sampling, cell versus landline test and fear tests
Reuters: U.S. intelligence says Iran government is not at risk of collapse: March assessment from three sources (page blocks scripts)

Analysis boxes are Peter’s World analysis, not statements by any agency or outlet. Featured photo: Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy vessels near the USS Paul Hamilton, Arabian Gulf, April 15, 2020, U.S. Navy photo (public domain), via Wikimedia Commons.

Iran’s IRGC Under Pressure: Polls, Repression and Pahlavi’s Plan

Key takeaways