Analysis framework · v2.0
Trade Lenses: How We Analyze the Trade War
A standardized framework for reading tariffs, export controls, sanctions, trade deals and supply chains: who depends on whom, who can hurt whom, and who gains from a deal.
By Peter’s World · Trade Lenses version 2.0 · October 2026
Purpose
Daily Trade War reports collect many facts: tariff notices, deficit figures, licences, court dates and company moves. Trade Lenses is the checklist we use to turn those facts into a judgment. Each lens asks one question and requires specific evidence, so a conclusion rests on a number, a date and a stated mechanism rather than on tone.
The central premise: in trade, leverage comes from dependence. A country holds leverage when its partner would lose more from ending trade than it would, and when the partner has no quick substitute.
The seven lenses
1Lens 1Deals & Agreements
What is signed, pending or collapsing, on what terms and deadlines?
Evidence needed: the text of the measure, effective date, tariff rate and the trade it is applied to, value covered, expiry.
2Lens 2Imbalances & Impact
What measurable change followed in balances, prices, flows and sectors, and is policy the cause?
Evidence needed: bilateral deficit with the period, exports and imports, change from a year earlier, and a statement of what the data cannot show.
3Lens 3Chokepoints & Dependencies
Who controls an input or route, and how long would substitution take?
Evidence needed: top-supplier share or top-three share, US import reliance, available substitutes, lead time, and licence or export-control status.
4Lens 4Negotiating Power
Who can hurt whom more, and who can wait longer?
Evidence needed: each side’s exposure and alternatives, market-access size, stockpiles, deadlines and domestic constraints. This lens is always labelled as assessed.
5Lens 5Policy & Economics
Which tariffs, sanctions, subsidies, currency, court or legislative moves are in play, and what do they do to the economy?
Evidence needed: the instrument, legal basis, rate and base, effective date, litigation status, and the price or revenue effect.
6Lens 6Bloc Competition
How are the US, China, the EU, CPTPP, RCEP, USMCA, BRICS, ASEAN, GCC and AfCFTA positioned?
Evidence needed: membership, share of world trade or output, accessions or exclusions, rules-of-origin changes.
7Lens 7Business & Markets
Which company, investment and market moves follow?
Evidence needed: company, amount, date, guidance, and the market level where a move is claimed.
How to read the ratings
A lens may end with a line such as Rating: 3 | Confidence: Medium | Trend: Stable. We show it only when the evidence supports one.
| Rating | Meaning |
|---|---|
| 1 | Clear US disadvantage |
| 2 | Modest US disadvantage |
| 3 | Balanced or contested |
| 4 | Modest US advantage |
| 5 | Clear US advantage |
| Confidence | Standard |
|---|---|
| High | Two independent official or primary sources agree. |
| Medium | One primary source plus reporting. |
| Low | The claim is reported or disputed only. |
- Trend compares the lens with the previous published report: Improving, Stable or Worsening. The first rated edition has no earlier rating, so it shows Stable.
Ratings are structured judgments, not measurements.
The leverage scoreboard
Inside Negotiating Power we may show a small table comparing the United States, China and the EU. For each, it gives the exposure (the share of trade at risk, with a figure), the alternatives (a substitute supplier or market and the months needed to switch), and a judged label of Strong, Mixed or Weak. Where an alternative’s lead time has not been published, the table says so instead of guessing.
| Actor | Exposure | Alternatives | Judged label |
|---|---|---|---|
| United States | Share of exports or imports at risk, with the figure | Substitute supplier or market, and months to switch | Strong, Mixed or Weak |
| China | Same measure, same period | Same measure | Strong, Mixed or Weak |
| EU | Same measure, same period | Same measure | Strong, Mixed or Weak |
Each report closes with a Trade Assessment: who has the leverage, the biggest chokepoint, the likeliest deal, the main risk and the US interest.
Quality rules
- A mechanism for every claim. We state how a cause leads to an effect, or we say the data do not show why.
- A counterpoint. Each lens states what the other side says or what the source cannot show.
- A US-interest sentence. We say what it means for jobs, prices, supply security, alliances or revenue.
- No padding. A lens under about 40 words or without a figure gets more research or is merged, never filled with background.
- Correlation is not cause. A shift in deficits is not proof of rerouting unless a source shows it.
- No mind-reading. We report what a government said and did, not what it wanted.
- Every figure carries its rate or value, base, date and source, and different datasets for one quantity are never blended.
Where the ideas come from
- Farrell and Newman, “Weaponized Interdependence” (International Security, 2019), argue that states with jurisdiction over central network nodes can gather information and deny access, which informs the Chokepoints lens (author’s page).
- Chad Bown’s PIIE working paper on the US-China trade war shows why a tariff figure needs its coverage and timing: it reports average duties near 20 percent covering more than half of bilateral trade (PIIE).
- The Global Trade Alert methodology documents each state act with a taxonomy of variables supported by trade-flow data, the model for our Policy & Economics evidence (GTA).
Worked example: Chokepoints & Dependencies, October 11, 2026
From the October 11 Trade War Update: “China supplied 71% of US rare-earth compound and metal imports in 2021-24 and the top three suppliers 89% by our sum, with net import reliance at 67% in 2025. China also mined about 69% of world rare-earth oxide in 2025 by our arithmetic, and its April 2025 licensing controls on seven medium and heavy rare earths remain in effect while the October 2025 expansion is suspended. The choke therefore runs through licences, and USGS says substitutes are ‘generally less effective’ without giving a lead time, so none is stated here.”
The check: it has a share with base and date, a mechanism (licences, not tonnage), a US-interest sentence and a counterpoint (US mine output). It also flags a gap, the missing substitution time, and rates the lens 2 (a modest US disadvantage) with Medium confidence.
How this differs from the Seven Lenses
The Seven Lenses of Geopolitical Power cover war and security theaters: geography, military, alliances, economics, technology, domestic politics and strategic leverage. Trade Lenses is built for trade disputes, so it puts deals, deficits, chokepoints, negotiating leverage, policy instruments, blocs and business at the center, each with its own metrics. Both use the same discipline: attributed facts, footnotes and a 1-5 rating only where the evidence allows.
Read it in practice
Trade Lenses version 2.0, October 2026. Ratings are structured judgments, not measurements. The framework is applied in the daily Trade War report from the October 11, 2026 edition. Featured graphic self-drawn by Peter’s World.
