Trade statistics answer two different questions. The first is how big commerce is. The second, which matters more for geopolitics, is who depends on whom, and where that dependence can be turned into pressure. A country can run a huge trade surplus and still be vulnerable if one supplier controls a single input. A small economy can have real leverage if the world cannot easily buy what it sells. This guide explains the metrics governments, analysts and journalists use to measure both, with the formula, a plain-English definition, a caveat and a data source for each. It is the reference behind our daily War Room Trade War reports and the Trade War hub.
Key takeaways
- Size is not leverage. The United States and China account for about 10.7% and 12.0% of world merchandise trade, by our calculation from the WTO’s 2025 totals. What matters in a dispute, though, is the share of one specific input that comes from one specific country.
- Dependence is a ratio. Export dependence is exports to one partner ÷ total exports. Import dependence is imports from one partner ÷ total imports. Critical-import dependence applies the same ratio to a single product.
- Chokepoints are physical metrics. The EIA estimates oil flow through the Strait of Hormuz averaged 20 million barrels a day in 2024, about 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption.
- Money is a form of reach. The IMF reports the dollar at 56.70% of global foreign-exchange reserves in the second quarter of 2026.
- Every number has a caveat. Forecasts get revised, sources use different valuation rules, and a ratio can hide who is actually exposed. We flag the main caveat beside each metric.
1. Trade volume: how big is commerce?
Volume metrics measure the size and direction of flows. They are the starting point because every other metric is a share of one of them. The WTO’s Global Trade Outlook and Statistics, October 2026 (published October 8, 2026) puts world merchandise exports at $26,275 billion in 2025 and imports at $26,651 billion. It forecasts merchandise trade volume growth of 3.9% in 2026, up from 1.9% in its March baseline, and 4.1% in 2027. In the first half of 2026, volume grew 3.5% year on year while the dollar value rose 15%, one of the widest gaps in recent years, because of higher energy and electronics prices.
| Metric | Plain English and formula | Why it matters | Caveat | Where to find it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total exports | What a country sells abroad. Sum of goods and services exports in a period. | Shows which economies supply the world, and so who can be missed. | Gross figures count re-exports, so hubs such as Hong Kong and Singapore look larger than their own output. | WTO statistics |
| Total imports | What a country buys abroad. | Shows who provides demand, and which economies other countries need as customers. | Imports are usually valued including freight and insurance (c.i.f.), exports without (f.o.b.), so world totals never match. | UN Comtrade |
| Total trade | Exports + imports. | A quick measure of how involved an economy is in global commerce. | Double counts goods that cross borders several times in a supply chain. | UNCTADstat |
| Trade balance | Exports − imports. A negative result is a deficit. | A deficit with one partner is a headline in disputes, but it is not by itself a loss. | Bilateral balances ignore services, investment income and where value is added. | U.S. Census Bureau and BEA |
| Trade as % of GDP | (Exports + imports) ÷ GDP × 100. Measures how exposed an economy is. | High ratios mean a shock abroad hits home faster. | Small, open economies score high almost by definition, and the ratio counts gross trade against value-added GDP. | World Bank |
| Goods vs. services | Split of trade between physical goods and services such as transport, finance and travel. | Goods can be blockaded or tariffed. Services mostly cannot, but can be sanctioned or regulated. | Services data are estimates, arrive later and are harder to attribute to a partner. | WTO and BEA |
| Year-over-year growth | (This period ÷ same period last year − 1) × 100, in volume or in value. | Separates real activity from price effects. | Value and volume diverge when prices move, as the first-half 2026 figures above show. | WTO Global Trade Outlook |
| Volume by region | Trade totals or growth grouped by continent or bloc. | Shows where growth comes from, and which regions are shrinking. | Regional groupings differ by source, so compare like with like. | UNCTADstat and OECD |
What the 2026 numbers show
The WTO says Asian economies are expected to contribute 4.0 percentage points of the 3.9% growth in 2026, more than the whole increase, while the Middle East pulls the “Rest of World” group down by 0.7 points because of the conflict. Middle East merchandise exports fell 27.7% year on year in the second quarter of 2026, after a 9.5% drop in the first. The WTO also reports that AI-enabling goods such as semiconductors and servers accounted for 47% of global merchandise trade growth in the first half of 2026, with trade in them up 67% from a year earlier.
Analysis (Peter’s World): Those figures show why a single headline growth rate can mislead. Asia’s gain and the Gulf’s collapse sit inside one number, and they reflect different kinds of exposure: one is a technology demand boom, the other a physical blockage of a route. Read the regional breakdown before the total.
Worked example (real figures, our arithmetic). The WTO’s 2025 table gives U.S. merchandise exports of $2,180 billion and imports of $3,505 billion, and China’s at $3,771 billion and $2,588 billion.
U.S. total merchandise trade = 2,180 + 3,505 = $5,685 billion. U.S. balance = 2,180 − 3,505 = −$1,325 billion.
China’s total = 3,771 + 2,588 = $6,359 billion. Its balance = 3,771 − 2,588 = +$1,183 billion.
World trade, averaging exports and imports: (26,275 + 26,651) ÷ 2 = $26,463 billion. U.S. share of world trade = 5,685 ÷ 52,926 = 10.7%. China’s = 6,359 ÷ 52,926 = 12.0%. Using the formula “own exports + imports ÷ world exports + imports” avoids relying on either side alone.
Trade intensity also varies. The World Bank’s indicator of trade as a share of GDP gives 25.0% for the United States and 38.0% for China in 2024. The lower U.S. ratio reflects a large domestic market, and tells you the U.S. economy is less exposed to a trade shock in aggregate. It does not say which U.S. industries are exposed, which is the job of the next section.
2. Trade dependence: who needs whom
This is the most important group for geopolitics, because leverage comes from asymmetric dependence, not from size. Political scientists Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman describe the idea as “weaponized interdependence”, where states that sit at central nodes in networks can deny access to others. The metrics below turn that idea into ratios you can compute.
| Metric | Plain English and formula | Why it matters | Caveat | Where to find it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Export dependence | Exports to country X ÷ total exports × 100. | A high share means the exporter needs X’s market, which gives X bargaining power. | Re-exports and transshipment can hide the true destination. | UN Comtrade |
| Import dependence | Imports from country X ÷ total imports × 100. | A high share means the importer needs X’s supply. | Country of origin and country of shipment can differ, and rules of origin change over time. | Census country data, UN Comtrade |
| Critical import dependence | Imports of product P from X ÷ total supply of P (imports + domestic output) × 100. | This is the leverage metric: a supplier of a hard-to-replace input can impose costs on the buyer. | Totals can hide embedded content, such as a chip inside an imported device. | USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries, IEA |
| Trade concentration | Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of partner shares: sum of each share squared, from 0 to 1 (or 0 to 10,000). | Summarizes how many partners matter. Higher means more exposed to a single one. | Does not show how easily each partner could be replaced. | UNCTADstat |
| Number of major partners | Count of partners above a threshold, such as 5% of trade. | More partners usually means more room to reroute. | The threshold is a judgment, so state it. | UN Comtrade |
| Bilateral trade as % of GDP | (Exports to X + imports from X) ÷ GDP × 100. | Shows how much of an economy rides on one relationship. | Gross trade is compared with value added, so the ratio overstates dependence. | Census with World Bank GDP |
Worked example 1 (hypothetical, for illustration only). Country A imports $50 billion of semiconductors a year, and $20 billion of that comes from Country B.
Critical import dependence = 20 ÷ 50 = 40%. If Country A has little domestic production, Country B has potential leverage, because a halt would remove two-fifths of A’s supply. How much leverage depends on how fast A can find substitutes, which the percentage alone does not tell you.
Worked example 2 (hypothetical): concentration. Country C’s imports come from four partners with shares of 50%, 30%, 10% and 10%.
HHI = 0.50² + 0.30² + 0.10² + 0.10² = 0.25 + 0.09 + 0.01 + 0.01 = 0.36 (3,600 on the 10,000 scale). If the same imports were split evenly, 25% each, HHI = 4 × 0.0625 = 0.25 (2,500). The first pattern is more concentrated, so a break with the 50% partner hurts more.
Worked example 3 (real figures). The U.S. Census Bureau’s 2025 data for goods trade with China show exports of $105,977.8 million and imports of $308,651.9 million.
Total goods trade = 105,977.8 + 308,651.9 = $414,629.7 million. Balance = 105,977.8 − 308,651.9 = −$202,674.1 million. Exports cover 105,977.8 ÷ 308,651.9 = 34.3% of imports.
The WTO reports that U.S. imports from China fell 29% in 2025, cutting China’s share of U.S. imports from 13.8% to 9.3%, against more than 20% before 2018. In the “import dependence” formula, that is a fall in the U.S. dependence on China for goods overall, which is a different thing from its dependence on China for any one product.
Analysis (Peter’s World): The aggregate share fell, but the sections below show why a lower total does not remove vulnerability. Dependence on rare earths or on one chemical can stay near 100% while the all-goods share drops. Always compute dependence at the product level for the goods that matter to defense, energy or medicine. Our History of China timeline covers the longer background of that relationship.
3. Strategic commodities: the supply chain from mine to dependence
Some goods carry more geopolitical weight than their dollar value suggests. The analytical chain is the same for each, and the last step is the one that counts.
The commodities to track: oil, natural gas, coal, uranium, rare earths, lithium, copper, iron ore, food and grain, fertilizer, semiconductors, batteries and the wider group of critical minerals. For each, ask four questions: Who produces it? Who exports it? Who imports it, and from whom? How much does the importer consume domestically? The answer to the last two gives the dependence.
The USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 reports that in 2025, imports made up more than half of U.S. apparent consumption for 54 nonfuel mineral commodities, and the United States was 100% net import reliant for 16 of them. On the rare earths chapter, 2025 world mine production was about 390,000 tons of rare-earth oxide equivalent, of which China produced 270,000 tons and the United States 51,000. China’s share of mine output is therefore 270,000 ÷ 390,000 = 69% and the U.S. share is 13% (our arithmetic from USGS rounded figures). The USGS puts U.S. net import reliance for rare-earth compounds and metals at 67% in 2025, and says China supplied 71% of those imports in 2021–24. For heavy rare earths, USGS lists net import reliance at 100%, and says China supplied all U.S. imports of terbium compounds and metals in 2021–24. It also describes China’s April 2025 export controls on several rare earths, and notes that China suspended a broader October 2025 set of controls for one year.
Energy works differently, because the leverage is physical flow rather than ore. The EIA’s tanker-tracking analysis says that 84% of the crude oil and condensate and 83% of the LNG moving through Hormuz in 2024 went to Asian markets, and that China, India, Japan and South Korea took 69% of the crude. Those four buyers carry the most exposure when the strait is disrupted, even though the United States imported only about 0.5 million barrels a day through it.
| Commodity | Why it can be a lever | Dependence question to ask | Data |
|---|---|---|---|
| Oil | Moves by sea through a few straits; used for transport and industry. | What share of crude imports crosses one chokepoint? | EIA chokepoints |
| Natural gas / LNG | LNG needs ships and terminals, so supply cannot be rerouted quickly. | How much LNG leaves through one strait or pipeline? | IEA |
| Coal | Still key for power and steel in Asia. | Which exporters supply which importers? | UNCTADstat |
| Uranium | Fuel-cycle steps are concentrated in a few countries. | Which country enriches the fuel a reactor needs? | IEA |
| Rare earths | Needed for magnets in motors, wind turbines and weapons; processing is concentrated. | What share of oxides and magnets comes from one country? | USGS |
| Lithium, copper, iron ore | Inputs to batteries, grids and steel. | Where is it mined, and where is it refined? | USGS |
| Food, grain, fertilizer | Hunger and price spikes follow supply cuts. The WTO notes global fertilizer exports under restrictive measures doubled to 15% after the Middle East conflict began. | Which exporters hold most of the surplus? | WTO |
| Semiconductors, batteries | Complex goods with few producers; rules on licensing matter. | Which country makes the chip or cell, and who controls the equipment? | WTO AI-goods analysis, UN Comtrade |
| Critical minerals (group) | The U.S. Final 2025 Critical Minerals List has 58 entries; many have few sources. | How many of the items have a single dominant supplier? | USGS, IEA |
Caveat: mine output is only the first step. Processing, refining and magnet manufacturing can be more concentrated than mining, and public statistics for those stages are thinner. A country can look diversified at the ore stage and still be dependent at the refinery.
4. Shipping and logistics: can the goods actually move?
Trade statistics record goods that arrived. Logistics metrics tell you whether they can. They matter most at chokepoints, narrow routes where a small disruption can stop a large flow.
| Metric | Plain English and formula | Why it matters | Caveat | Where to find it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Container shipping volume | Containers moved, in twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU). | A broad gauge of manufactured-goods trade. | Counts empties and transshipped boxes twice. | UNCTADstat |
| Shipping costs and freight rates | Price per container or per tonne on a route. | Higher costs act like a tax and show stress early. | Spot and contract rates differ widely. | NY Fed supply-chain index |
| Port throughput and congestion | Cargo handled per period; days vessels wait. | A port closure or queue shows where flows are being rerouted. | Throughput can rise at one port because another fell, so look at the region. | WTO, Chart 18 |
| Vessel traffic | Count of transits through a route per day or year. | The most direct sign of whether a chokepoint is working. | Different authorities count ships and tonnage differently. | Panama Canal Authority, Suez Canal Authority |
| Strait of Hormuz / Red Sea flows | Oil and gas barrels, and ships, passing through. | Shows which flows have no alternative route; figures follow below. | Alternatives such as pipelines have limited capacity. | EIA |
| Average shipping time | Door-to-door or port-to-port days. | Rerouting around Africa adds days and fuel cost. | Depends on the route and on the data provider. | NY Fed and carrier data |
| Supply-chain disruptions | Composite indexes of delays, backlogs and prices. | A summary of stress across many routes. | Composite indexes mix many inputs, so check the components. | NY Fed GSCPI |
Chokepoints in the numbers
The EIA estimates that only about 2.6 million barrels a day of Saudi and UAE pipeline capacity could bypass Hormuz in a disruption, against flows of about 20 million barrels a day, so a closure cannot simply be absorbed. The WTO notes that container throughput at Jebel Ali, the UAE’s largest port, fell about 60% year on year in the first half of 2026 and about 90% in the second quarter, while throughput rose around 40% at Oman’s Sohar, 15% at Salalah and nearly 79% at Jeddah’s South Container Terminal. For the live situation see our Strait of Hormuz explainer and the Iran news hub.
The chart shows two different stories. The Suez Canal Authority’s table records 26,434 transits in 2023 and 12,758 in 2025, a fall of 51.7% by our arithmetic, and net tonnage fell from 1,568.3 million to 522.1 million, down 66.7%. The Panama Canal Authority reports 13,404 transits in fiscal 2025 against 11,240 in fiscal 2024, up 19.3%, as the canal recovered from drought limits. The two canals are not comparable ship for ship, since they use different tonnage measures, and the Suez table does not state a cause for its fall. Treat the numbers as a measure of how traffic has moved, and use the news reporting to explain why.
5. Tariffs and trade barriers: the economic-warfare toolkit
This group tracks deliberate attempts to change trade flows. Some tools raise prices (tariffs). Some cap quantities (quotas). Some forbid trade outright (embargoes). Others work through rules on technology and finance (export controls, sanctions, investment screening).
| Metric | Plain English and formula | Why it matters | Caveat | Where to find it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Average tariff rate | Simple average of tariff lines, or trade-weighted average (duties ÷ import value). | Shows the general level of protection. | Simple averages treat every product equally. Trade-weighted averages fall when a high tariff cuts the trade it applies to. | WTO tariff profiles, World Bank |
| Tariff by product | Rate for a given product code. | Targeted tariffs reveal strategic priorities. | Exclusions and exemptions change the real rate. | USTR Section 301 actions |
| Tariff by trading partner | Rate that applies to goods from a given country. | Partner-specific rates are the clearest political signal. | Trade can shift to third countries, and this dilutes the effect. | USTR |
| Number of tariffs / measures | Count of new measures in a period. | Shows the pace of policy change. | Counts do not show size or coverage. | Global Trade Alert |
| Tariff revenue | Customs duties collected, in dollars. | Shows how much of the cost lands on importers and the Treasury. | Refunds and fiscal-year timing change the headline. | Monthly Treasury Statement |
| Export restrictions | Controls on what a country will let others buy. | Used to withhold technology or materials. | Licenses can be loosened or tightened quietly. | BIS Entity List |
| Import quotas | A cap on quantity. | Limits volume regardless of price. | Quotas are often allocated by country. | USTR |
| Sanctions and embargoes | Legal bans on dealing with named persons, firms or whole countries. | Coercive power over finance and shipping. | Enforcement varies, and evasion routes appear. | OFAC recent actions |
| Anti-dumping measures | Duties on goods sold below fair value. | A common tool in steel, solar and chemicals. | Often last for years once imposed. | WTO |
| Investment restrictions | Screening of foreign buyers or capital outflows. | Controls long-term influence. | Hard to quantify. | USCC annual reports |
Worked example (real figures). The Treasury’s Monthly Treasury Statement for September 2025 lists customs duties of $194,866 million for fiscal 2025 and $77,037 million for fiscal 2024.
Change = 194,866 − 77,037 = $117,829 million, and ratio = 194,866 ÷ 77,037 = 2.53 times.
That is a record of what the Treasury collected, which is not the same as the tariff rate, and does not show who bore the cost.
Worked example (hypothetical): effective tariff rate. Suppose a country imports $2,000 billion of goods and collects $100 billion in duties. Effective rate = 100 ÷ 2,000 = 5%. If importers shift $200 billion of purchases to untaxed sources, collections fall and the effective rate falls, even if the legal rates never change.
Analysis (Peter’s World): The effective rate is the number that most often gets lost in debates, because a headline tariff of 25% or 50% on one product says nothing about its share of imports. For readers following the Trade War update of October 9, the useful questions are what share of imports a measure covers and how fast trade reroutes around it.
6. Currency and financial trade
Trade is settled in money, and the infrastructure of money is a source of leverage. A country that can freeze or block payments in a currency has power over anyone who needs it.
| Metric | Plain English and formula | Why it matters | Caveat | Where to find it |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Exchange rates | Price of one currency in another. | A fall in the importer’s currency raises the cost of dependence. | Nominal rates ignore inflation differences. | Federal Reserve |
| Foreign-exchange reserves | Foreign-currency assets held by central banks. | A cushion against shocks, and a record of which currencies states trust. | Some holdings are not reported. | IMF COFER |
| Dollar / euro / renminbi share of reserves | One currency’s holdings ÷ total allocated reserves × 100. | Shows relative standing of reserve currencies. | Valuation moves with exchange rates, not just buying and selling. | IMF COFER data brief |
| Dollar share of trade | Share of trade invoiced or settled in dollars. | Invoicing in dollars gives the U.S. reach through its banks. | No single official series; estimates differ by method. | Atlantic Council monitor |
| SWIFT and payment systems | Messages and values moved on the SWIFT network and on alternatives. | Cutting a bank off from SWIFT is a sanction tool. | SWIFT counts messages, not final settlement. | SWIFT Global Currency Tracker (page not readable from our servers) |
| Cross-border capital flows and FDI | Money invested across borders, measured as stock or flow. | Controls long-term influence over factories, ports and firms. | Round-tripping through tax havens inflates totals. | BEA, UNCTADstat |
The IMF’s COFER data brief of September 30, 2026 reports total official foreign-exchange reserves of $13.22 trillion in the second quarter of 2026, up from $13.10 trillion in the first. The dollar’s share was 56.70%, down from 57.18%, a drop of 0.48 percentage points. The euro’s share rose to 20.60% from 20.04%, the renminbi’s to 2.11% from 1.98%, and the yen’s fell to 4.96% from 5.43%. The IMF says exchange-rate effects were limited, so most of the change reflects portfolio choices and price changes.
Analysis (Peter’s World): Two points follow. A 0.48-point move in a quarter is small, and the gap between the dollar and the renminbi is still more than 54 percentage points. Reserve share is also a slow indicator. If you want to measure the use of alternative payment systems, the better signals are settlement volumes and invoicing practices, which are published less often and less consistently.
7. Trade power: turning the metrics into leverage
In our framework, trade power is the ability to influence another country’s economic choices through market access, supply, demand, finance and logistics. It is not a single published statistic. It is a judgment built from the metrics above, and each row below tells you what a given metric reveals.
| Metric | What it tells you |
|---|---|
| Export share | Who supplies the world |
| Import share | Who demands the world’s goods |
| Trade / GDP | How exposed an economy is |
| Market concentration | How dependent trade is |
| Critical imports | Vulnerability |
| Shipping chokepoints | Physical vulnerability |
| Currency dominance | Financial leverage |
| Sanctions | Coercive power |
| Tariffs | Protection and leverage |
| FDI | Long-term economic influence |
To use the table, score a country on each row, then look for asymmetry. A state with a high export share to a partner that has low import dependence on it has little leverage. A state that supplies a hard-to-replace input to partners with high critical-import dependence has a lot. This is also why two countries of similar size can have very different trade power.
Judgment: Peter’s World treats trade power as a framework for explaining events, not a forecast. Any ranking depends on which metrics you weight, and we do not publish a single score.
8. Dashboard starter: the 10 metrics
If you track only ten numbers, these give the broadest picture. The table shows the formula, source, usual update rhythm and the lens each belongs to. Where we have a current verified reading, it is listed in the last column.
| # | Metric | Formula | Source | Update frequency | Lens | Latest verified reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Global trade volume | World exports + imports (value), or volume index | WTO | Outlook twice a year, annual statistics | Trade & Economics | 2025: $26,275bn exports, $26,651bn imports (WTO) |
| 2 | U.S. share of global trade | (U.S. exports + imports) ÷ (world exports + imports) | WTO | Annual | Trade & Economics / Power | 10.7% of merchandise trade in 2025 (our calculation) |
| 3 | China share of global trade | (China exports + imports) ÷ (world exports + imports) | WTO | Annual | Trade & Economics / Power | 12.0% of merchandise trade in 2025 (our calculation) |
| 4 | Global trade growth | (Volume this year ÷ last year − 1) | WTO | Outlook twice a year | Trade & Economics | Forecast 3.9% for 2026; 3.5% in H1 2026 (WTO, Oct 8, 2026) |
| 5 | U.S.–China bilateral trade | U.S. exports to China + imports from China | Census | Monthly | Alliances / Power | 2025: $414.6bn goods trade (Census) |
| 6 | Trade balance | Exports − imports | BEA / Census | Monthly | Trade & Economics | 2025 U.S. goods and services deficit $901.5bn (BEA) |
| 7 | Critical supply-chain dependence | Imports from one source ÷ total supply, per product | USGS | Annual | Technology / Power | Rare-earth compounds: 67% U.S. net import reliance, 2025 (USGS) |
| 8 | Container / shipping rates | Index or $ per container on key routes | NY Fed GSCPI | Monthly | Geography | Not given: no figure verified |
| 9 | Global tariff rate | Average of applied tariffs, trade-weighted | WTO tariff profiles | Annual | Power & Leverage | Not given: no figure verified. U.S. customs duties $194.9bn in FY2025 (Treasury) |
| 10 | Dollar share of trade / finance | Dollar holdings ÷ total allocated reserves | IMF COFER | Quarterly | Power & Leverage | 56.70% of reserves, Q2 2026 (IMF) |
9. Connecting trade to the six lenses
Peter’s World analyses events through six lenses: Geography, Military, Alliances, Trade and Economics, Technology, and Power and Leverage. They appear at the top of every War Room report. Trade metrics fit inside them, and the fourth lens is where most of the numbers on this page sit.
Our analytical framework. For the full seven-lens framework, with indicators, scoring and a report template, see The Seven Lenses of Geopolitical Power.
- Geography: chokepoint traffic, shipping time and port throughput.
- Military: who can protect or block a route, and what defense industries import.
- Alliances: preferential access, bilateral trade and sanctions coordination.
- Trade and Economics: volume, balance, dependence and tariffs.
- Technology: semiconductors, critical minerals and export controls.
- Power and Leverage: currency dominance, financial reach and the trade power table.
Used this way, trade becomes more than an economics segment. It is a way of explaining where countries have leverage over one another, and where that leverage can fail. For the regional cases, see the Taiwan–China hub, the Iran hub and our History section.
Frequently asked questions
What is the difference between trade volume and trade value?
Value is measured in dollars and moves with prices. Volume strips out price changes. The two can move far apart in a year of energy price shocks.
How do you measure trade dependence?
Divide trade with one partner by total trade, either exports (export dependence) or imports (import dependence). For leverage, apply the same ratio to one product, such as a mineral or chip.
Does a trade deficit mean a country is losing?
Not by itself. A deficit measures imports exceeding exports. It can reflect strong demand or capital inflows, and bilateral deficits ignore services and where value is added.
What is a chokepoint?
A narrow sea route, such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal or the Panama Canal, where a small disruption can stop large flows.
Where can I find official trade data?
Start with the WTO, UNCTADstat, UN Comtrade, the World Bank, the U.S. Census Bureau and BEA. The Sources section lists each with a link.
Why does the dollar’s share of reserves matter?
Reserve currencies are used to pay for trade and hold savings. The dollar is the largest share of official reserves, which gives the United States financial reach through banks and payment systems.
Glossary
Open the glossary (13 terms: balance of trade, chokepoint, COFER, HHI and more)
- Balance of trade
- Exports minus imports.
- c.i.f. / f.o.b.
- Import values that include freight and insurance, versus export values that do not.
- Chokepoint
- A narrow route, such as a strait or canal, through which a large share of trade passes.
- COFER
- The IMF’s Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves.
- Critical minerals
- Minerals designated as vital to the economy or defense and at risk of supply disruption.
- Economic coercion
- Using trade, finance or technology access to push another state to change its behavior.
- FDI
- Foreign direct investment: lasting ownership of a business in another country.
- HHI
- Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, the sum of squared shares, used to measure concentration.
- Net import reliance
- Imports minus exports, as a share of apparent consumption (a USGS measure).
- Re-exports
- Imported goods exported again with little change.
- Sanctions
- Legal restrictions on dealing with named countries, firms or people.
- TEU
- Twenty-foot equivalent unit, a container size used to count shipments.
- Trade power
- The ability to influence another country’s economic choices through market access, supply, demand, finance and logistics.
Sources
Sources (11): the official releases behind every figure on this page. Open the list.
- WTO, Global Trade Outlook and Statistics, October 2026: published Oct 8, 2026: 2025 trade totals and shares, 2026 and 2027 forecasts, H1 2026 growth, regional and port data.
- U.S. Census Bureau, trade in goods with China: 2025 monthly and annual totals.
- BEA, U.S. International Trade in Goods and Services, December and Annual 2025: 2025 goods and services totals.
- IMF, COFER data brief, Sept 30, 2026: 2026 Q2 reserve shares.
- USGS, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026: Rare earths: 2025 production and net import reliance.
- USGS, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2026 (introduction): 54 and 16 commodity counts.
- U.S. EIA, Strait of Hormuz oil chokepoint, June 16, 2025: 2024 flows, destinations and bypass capacity.
- Panama Canal Authority, fiscal 2025 results: transits and tonnage.
- Suez Canal Authority, statistics for 2025: transits and net tonnage, 2023 to 2025.
- U.S. Treasury, Monthly Treasury Statement, September 2025: customs duties, fiscal 2024 and 2025.
- World Bank, trade as a share of GDP: 2024 values for the U.S. and China.
Additional sources
Additional data portals (opened and working; open the list)
- UNCTADstat: trade, shipping and investment statistics
- UN Comtrade: bilateral trade by product
- OECD data: trade and investment indicators
- USTR: Section 301 tariff actions
- Bureau of Industry and Security: Entity List and export controls
- OFAC: sanctions actions
- U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission: annual reports
- IEA: Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025
- NY Fed: Global Supply Chain Pressure Index
- Global Trade Alert: trade-policy measures
- Atlantic Council: Dollar Dominance Monitor
- SWIFT: Global Currency Tracker (could not be opened from our servers; link unverified)
Further reading: Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman, “Weaponized Interdependence” (International Security, 2019).
Related coverage
War Room · Trade War hub · Trade War Update, October 9 · Strait of Hormuz explained · Iran hub · Taiwan–China hub · China history
