IRGC Investigation: Crimes Against Humanity and Genocidal Intent

Evergreen explainer. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is Iran’s most powerful security institution and is the subject of sanctions, terrorism designations and, since 2022, repeated UN findings about the conduct of Iranian state forces. This page examines allegations of IRGC crimes against humanity and the separate question of genocidal intent. It separates what UN bodies have found, what NGOs and media allege, what Iran says, and what the law requires. It covers developments up to September 30, 2026.

Contents

1. Summary and key takeaways

The short version, in four evidence tiers:

  • Found by a UN body (not a court): The UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Iran (FFMI) has found “reasonable grounds to believe” that Iranian authorities committed crimes against humanity during the 2022–23 “Woman, Life, Freedom” repression and again during the 2025–26 protest crackdown. In its September 2026 report it said many violations amount to the crimes against humanity of murder, imprisonment, torture and other inhumane acts as part of a widespread and systematic attack on civilians. The FFMI attributes the violations mainly to State “security forces”; its March 2026 paper notes IRGC and Basij deployment to protest sites, but it does not single out the IRGC as the sole perpetrator. (A/HRC/63/61, OHCHR)
  • Alleged by NGOs and media: Rights groups such as HRANA, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International report mass killings, torture and arbitrary detention; HRANA’s documented toll is higher than the government’s list. These are allegations, not court findings.
  • Disputed or denied: Iran rejects allegations of systematic violations, blames “terrorists and rioters” backed by foreign enemies for the 2026 violence, and calls the designations of the IRGC illegal and political. It also says economic sanctions themselves amount to crimes against humanity.
  • Genocide: No court or UN body has found that Iran or the IRGC committed genocide. In the three FFMI reports reviewed for this page (September 2026, March 2026 and the March 2026 consolidated findings), the word “genocide” does not appear. A former UN Special Rapporteur, Javaid Rehman, said in 2024 that Iranian authorities acted with “destructive, arguably genocidal intent” toward Baháʼís in the 1980s and that 1980s executions amounted to genocide, but he did so as an independent expert, not as a court, and his own report acknowledges legal difficulties. Genocide requires proof of a specific intent to destroy a protected group, a higher bar than crimes against humanity.
  • Culture and ideology (Sections 6–7): Sources document restrictions on minority languages, heritage gatherings, women’s singing and dress, mostly by the state at large; the IRGC is directly named in only some episodes. The constitution gives the IRGC an “ideological mission,” and Khomeini spoke of “exporting” the revolution, but analysts disagree on how far ideology or security strategy drives IRGC policy abroad. No source reviewed supports a goal of forced conversion.

Key numbers are contested. The Iranian government published a list of 3,038 people killed in the January 2026 crackdown; the FFMI said it could not verify a toll but believes the real figure is likely higher; HRANA documented 7,007 fatalities in the first 50 days, including 207 security or government personnel.

2. What the IRGC is

History and structure

According to the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), the IRGC was founded after the 1979 revolution as a counterweight to Iran’s regular armed forces and answers to the Supreme Leader, bypassing the elected president. The Iran–Iraq War (1980–88) turned it into a conventional force. CFR, citing the International Institute for Strategic Studies, puts it at upward of 190,000 personnel. (CFR backgrounder)

The UK government describes six main branches: the Ground Force, Navy, Aerospace Force, Qods (Quds) Force, the IRGC Intelligence Organisation and the Basij. In the UK’s description, the Qods Force undertakes foreign military operations and the Intelligence Organisation is the IRGC’s main intelligence body. (UK Home Office factsheet) CFR reports that the Basij paramilitary was placed under direct IRGC command in 2007.

The FFMI adds a detail relevant to human rights: it says its evidence shows IRGC intelligence runs its own network of detention facilities outside the authority of Iran’s Prisons Organization, including Ward 2-A (also called Ward 325) inside Evin prison. (A/HRC/61/CRP.2, para. 81)

Economy and politics

CFR says the IRGC runs a large commercial network spanning construction, banking, shipping, manufacturing and imports, and quotes a 2020 Center for Strategic and International Studies report saying it has become “the most powerful controller of all important economic sectors across Iran.” CFR also says many veterans hold senior government posts. Iranian officials have not accepted that characterization in the sources reviewed here.

Leadership has changed sharply in 2026. The FFMI notes that Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and IRGC commander Mohammad Pakpour were killed in U.S.–Israeli strikes that began on 28 February 2026, and that Ahmad Vahidi became IRGC head in March. The BBC reported on 8 March that the Assembly of Experts named Mojtaba Khamenei as the new Supreme Leader. (FFMI; BBC)

Designations and sanctions

JurisdictionStatus (as of Sep 30, 2026)Primary source
United StatesIRGC designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization (notice signed 8 April 2019, published in the Federal Register 15 April 2019). Earlier, on 25 October 2007, the IRGC was designated under E.O. 13382 (proliferation) and the IRGC-Qods Force under E.O. 13224 (terrorism). On 15 January 2026 Treasury sanctioned officials, including IRGC provincial commanders, over the protest crackdown.Federal Register · Treasury 2007 · Treasury 2026
European UnionCouncil formally added the IRGC to the EU terrorist list on 19 February 2026, following a political agreement on 29 January. Its assets in EU states are frozen.EU Law Live · CNBC-TV18
United KingdomDesignated on 17 July 2026 under the National Security (State Threats) Act 2026, a proscription-like power for state bodies. The UK explanatory memorandum says the IRGC was already sanctioned in its entirety.GOV.UK · SI 2026/847 · Explanatory memo
CanadaListed as a terrorist entity under the Criminal Code on 19 June 2024; the Qods Force had been listed earlier.CBC News
AustraliaListed as a “state sponsor of terrorism” on 27 November 2025, after ASIO assessed the IRGC had orchestrated attacks on Jewish targets in Sydney and Melbourne.Australian Government · BBC

Iran’s response: After the EU’s 29 January political agreement, Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmaeil Baghaei called the move “completely illegal” and “unjustified” (Mehr, 3 February) and said Iran summoned European ambassadors. (Mehr News Agency) A designation is a government policy decision, not a judicial finding of guilt.

Crimes against humanity

Article 7 of the Rome Statute defines a crime against humanity as any of a listed set of acts “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.” The list includes murder, extermination, imprisonment, torture, rape and other sexual violence, persecution, enforced disappearance and other inhumane acts. Article 7(2)(a) defines an “attack” as a course of conduct involving multiple such acts “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy.” Persecution can target a group on political, racial, ethnic, religious or gender grounds, among others.

Genocide

Article II of the Genocide Convention (mirrored in Article 6 of the Rome Statute) covers five listed acts, such as killing members of the group, “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such.” The intent to destroy the group is the special intent (dolus specialis). Political groups are not among the protected categories. Article III also makes “direct and public incitement to commit genocide” a punishable act.

War crimes and the intent standard

War crimes are serious violations of international humanitarian law in armed conflict; they require neither a “widespread or systematic” attack on civilians nor a specific intent to destroy a group. The FFMI applied them in 2026 to a U.S. strike (see Section 4).

Legal analysis: Genocidal intent is hard to prove. The International Court of Justice has said that when intent is inferred from a pattern of conduct, that inference must be the only one that could reasonably be drawn. Lawyers at Amnesty International argue this does not require genocidal intent to be the only intent a state has, only that it be the only reasonable inference from the pattern; other scholars read the standard more strictly. (Opinio Juris, an advocacy-side reading) In practice, the same facts can satisfy crimes against humanity, which needs a widespread or systematic attack on civilians, without satisfying genocide, which needs proof of intent to destroy a group as such.

Standard of proof: UN fact-finding bodies apply “reasonable grounds to believe,” the general practice of UN investigative bodies, according to the FFMI. Reuters notes such missions are investigative, not judicial, and initiate no criminal cases, though their findings can be used by courts. (CRP.2, para. 19; Reuters)

4. Alleged crimes, by source

Everything below is an allegation or a UN finding by an investigative body unless a court is named. Where sources say “security forces,” the IRGC is one of several bodies involved and attribution to a specific unit is often incomplete.

4.1 Domestic repression

2009. CFR reports that the IRGC allegedly helped fix the 2009 presidential election and that rights groups documented Basij attacks on protesters; thousands were detained.

November 2019. Amnesty International documented the names of 304 people killed by security forces during the November 2019 protests and said most lethal force was unlawful; it also reported more than 7,000 arrests. (Amnesty; Trampling Humanity) The FFMI, citing the UN Special Rapporteur, records at least 328 killed and says witnesses reported IRGC personnel using heavy machine guns against protesters in Mahshahr, Khuzestan. It also notes a member of parliament acknowledged 230 deaths. (CRP.2, paras. 531–535)

2022–23 “Woman, Life, Freedom.” After Jina Mahsa Amini died in custody in September 2022, the FFMI concluded in March 2024 that violations, including murder, imprisonment, torture, rape and other sexual violence, persecution and enforced disappearance, amounted to crimes against humanity committed against women, girls and others supporting human rights, as reported by the Guardian. Human Rights Watch, quoted there, counted more than 500 killed, including 68 children. The FFMI said Iran refused to cooperate. Its March 2025 report added that ethnic and religious minorities, in particular Kurds and Baluch, and LGBTQ+ persons were victims of crimes against humanity as separately persecuted groups.

In one case the FFMI documents, an IRGC Basij member was convicted in January 2024 of killing a man in Malard; according to credible information, the judiciary head reclassified the killing at the request of the then IRGC head, and in October 2025 the Supreme Court convicted him of “quasi-intentional homicide,” sentenced him to three years and ordered the IRGC to pay “blood money.” (CRP.2, paras. 573–575) The FFMI also says IRGC and Basij personnel fall under military courts that lack independence (para. 521).

2025–26 protests. Protests began on 28 December 2025. In its September 2026 report the FFMI found killings by security forces on “a staggering and unprecedented scale” in all 31 provinces, at least 221 children reportedly killed, attacks on hospitals, torture and solitary confinement of detainees, the longest nationwide internet shutdown on record from 8 January, and at least 29 men executed between March and August 2026 in connection with the protests, five publicly. (OHCHR; Council statement, 21 Sep 2026) It said Iran is responsible for gross violations and that many amount to crimes against humanity. The FFMI’s earlier March 2026 paper noted that armed Basij and IRGC personnel deployed to protest sites from 8 January, and that on 3 January Khamenei said “rioters” should be “put in their place” while an IRGC provincial corps declared “the period of appeasement” over. (CRP.2, paras. 26, 33) The U.S. Treasury alleged on 15 January that IRGC elements attacked wounded protesters in a hospital in Ilam Province. (Treasury)

NGO figures: HRANA reported 7,007 fatalities in the first 50 days (6,488 protesters, 236 children, 76 other civilians, 207 security or government personnel), with a further 11,744 cases under review. (HRANA) Human Rights Watch reported mass killings after 8 January and counted at least 400 bodies visible in videos at one Tehran morgue. (HRW)

Executions. Amnesty International recorded at least 2,159 executions in Iran in 2025, more than double its 2024 figure, with 998 for drug offences. (Amnesty)

Iran’s response: Iran’s ambassador in Geneva told the Council the protests were “peaceful at the beginning but immediately evolved into violent unrest amid external interferences,” cited weapons smuggling, and said the FFMI failed to address what Iran calls crimes against humanity through economic coercion. Iran told the FFMI that groups under “terrorist elements” committed killings. (UN Geneva transcript; A/HRC/63/61, para. 28)

4.2 The 1980s and the 1988 prison killings

Court finding: In July 2022 a Stockholm court sentenced Hamid Nouri to life in prison over the 1988 executions, under universal jurisdiction; the BBC reported the verdict as war crimes and murder. Human rights groups say between 2,800 and 5,000 prisoners were hanged in secret after Ayatollah Khomeini ordered the execution of prisoners loyal to the People’s Mujahedin (MEK); Iran called the verdict “political.” (BBC) Sweden’s Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal in March 2024 (JURIST) and in June 2024 he was exchanged in a prisoner swap for two Swedes held in Iran. (AP)

UN expert view: In a July 2024 report Rehman said the 1981–82 and 1988 executions “amounted to crimes against humanity of murder and extermination, as well as genocide.” His report lists members of the Revolutionary Guards among a broad group of people involved in the executions, alongside judges, prosecutors, intelligence representatives and prison guards; it does not isolate the IRGC as a unit. AFP noted he does not speak on behalf of the United Nations. Iran rejected the report and accused him of serving MEK interests. (OHCHR report; VOA/AFP; RFE/RL) This is the strongest UN-linked statement on genocide in the sources reviewed, and it concerns the 1980s, not the current period.

4.3 Treatment of minorities

Baháʼís. The FFMI describes the Bahá’í, Iran’s largest non-Muslim religious minority at roughly 300,000 members, as facing arbitrary arrests, denial of education and employment and property confiscation. It documented official hate speech: the Ministry of Intelligence called the Bahá’í faith a “Zionist sect” on 28 July 2025, and Raja News, reportedly affiliated with the IRGC, accused Bahá’ís of being “proxies and spies of Israel.” (CRP.2, paras. 206–208) Rehman went further for the 1980s, saying Baháʼís were targeted “with destructive, arguably genocidal intent,” and HRW said in April 2024 that persecution of Baháʼís constitutes a crime against humanity (as reported by AFP).

Baluch, Kurds and Ahwazi Arabs. The FFMI’s March 2025 report found Kurds and Baluch were victims of crimes against humanity as separate persecuted groups, and in 2025 it documented a 1 July raid on Gunich village in Sistan and Baluchestan that killed at least one woman and injured 11 other Baluch women, more than 250 Kurdish arrests, indictments of 23 people from Khuzestan on “spying for Israel” charges, and the execution of six Arab men on 4 October 2025 for alleged collaboration with Israel. (CRP.2, paras. 3, 194, 201–203) The Mission said security measures after the June 2025 war appeared to affect minorities disproportionately.

4.4 External operations and foreign nationals

Regional network. CFR reports the Qods Force deployed to Syria after 2011 and, per CFR, Iran later acknowledged it was helping President Assad suppress unrest; it also supports Hezbollah, Hamas, Iraqi militias and Yemen’s Houthis. We found no court ruling on whether the IRGC bears criminal responsibility for those groups’ conduct. On 23 September 2026 the AP, citing 10 anonymous officials and soldiers, reported IRGC advisers helped direct a Houthi offensive on Yemen’s Red Sea coast; Iran’s UN mission did not respond to AP. (AP; CFR)

Flight PS752. On 8 January 2020 Iranian forces shot down Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752, killing all 176 aboard. Iran’s own filing to the International Court of Justice says Iran’s military shot the plane down “in error” during a period of heightened alert. Canada, Sweden, Ukraine and the UK brought a case at the ICAO Council; Iran has appealed the Council’s jurisdiction ruling to the ICJ, and a 3 September 2026 order set 21 October 2026 for Iran’s reply and 22 March 2027 for the states’ rejoinder. No merits ruling exists. (ICJ case 198; CBC reports the IRGC fired the missiles)

Foreign nationals. The FFMI notes authorities did not promptly disclose the fate of dual and foreign nationals held by security bodies. AP described the 2024 Swedish exchange as part of a “long-running strategy” of using people with foreign ties as bargaining chips; Iranian state television said Nouri was “illegally detained.” (CRP.2, para. 116; AP)

Plots abroad. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, as summarised by the FFMI, four men were convicted in March 2025 and January 2026 in two separate plots to kill Masih Alinejad on instructions from high-ranking IRGC members. (CRP.2, para. 458) Australia’s ASIO said in August 2025 it had linked arson attacks on a Sydney café and a Melbourne synagogue to IRGC commanders using criminal proxies; Iran “absolutely rejected” the allegation, and Australia expelled Iran’s ambassador. (BBC) The UK government assessed that IRGC Qods Force members “almost certainly” directed a group called IMCR, which claimed attacks on Jewish and Israeli targets across Europe in 2026. (UK factsheet) These are government assessments and criminal-case allegations, not UN findings.

4.5 The 2025–2026 war context

Israel and Iran fought a war in June 2025, and U.S.–Israeli strikes on Iran began on 28 February 2026. The FFMI considered both sides. It found “reasonable grounds to believe” U.S. forces committed war crimes in two 28 February strikes: one on the Shajareh Tayyebeh primary school in Minab, which it said stood about 72 metres from an IRGC naval complex and was clearly identifiable as a school, and one on a sports complex in Lamerd. Reuters reported the Pentagon declined to comment, the White House said the UN Human Rights Council had “accomplished nothing for human rights,” and CENTCOM has denied striking Lamerd. (A/HRC/63/61, paras. 81–86, 124–128; Reuters)

The Mission also said Iranian strikes in the region had hit residential buildings and civilian airports, and that Iran “instrumentalised” the hostilities as a pretext for intensified repression. On the June 2025 Israeli strike on Evin prison, it found no information that IRGC or intelligence personnel were directly participating in hostilities from the compound. (Council statement; CRP.2, para. 82)

5. The genocidal-intent question

What UN investigators have and have not concluded

The FFMI has concluded that crimes against humanity occurred and has named persecution and other inhumane acts. It has not, in the September 2026 report, its March 2026 report or the March 2026 consolidated findings, used the word “genocide.” That absence is not a finding that genocide could never be established; the FFMI simply did not reach or address it in those documents. Its mandate continues to 2028, and its mandate resolution asks it to preserve evidence for future proceedings. (OHCHR mandate page)

Rehman’s 2024 report is different. He concluded Iranian authorities acted with “destructive, arguably genocidal intent” toward Baháʼís in the early years of the revolution, and argued that MEK members, perceived by their persecutors as deviants who had “deserted Islam,” could be treated as a religious group within the Convention’s protected categories. The report itself recognises “considerable legal challenges,” including that the Convention excludes political opposition groups. (Rehman report)

Rhetoric toward Israel

Iranian officials have long called for the “elimination” of what they call the Zionist regime. Scholars disagree on the legal meaning. Joshua Teitelbaum, in a 2009 Hoover Institution article, argued that statements by Ahmadinejad and Khamenei, such as Khamenei’s 2000 description of Israel as a “cancerous tumor” to be uprooted, amount to incitement to genocide, and notes that others, including Juan Cole and Stephen Walt, dispute that reading. (Hoover Institution) Khamenei said in 2019 that “abolition of the Israeli regime” does not mean abolishing Jewish people and that Palestinians of all faiths should choose their government. (France 24/AFP)

Analysis: Under Article III of the Genocide Convention, incitement must be direct and public and tied to genocide against a protected group. Whether calls to end a state amount to calls to destroy its population is exactly what is disputed. We found no UN body or court finding on this question in the sources reviewed. It is best described as a contested legal argument, not an established finding.

Counterarguments and what would be needed

  • For a genocide finding: the argument made by Rehman (for the 1980s and Baháʼís) and by Teitelbaum (for rhetoric toward Israel) rests on executions of people whom their persecutors treated as apostates, sustained persecution of Baháʼís, and public statements about Israel, read through the ICJ’s inference-from-pattern approach.
  • Against, or not yet met: Analysis: most victims of the 2022 and 2026 crackdowns were targeted as protesters or dissenters, a category the Convention does not protect, and the FFMI’s findings on them are framed as crimes against humanity. No document reviewed here shows a court or UN body inferring an intent to destroy the Baháʼí, Baluch, Kurdish or Arab communities as such.
  • Iran’s position: Iran rejects the FFMI’s findings and Rehman’s report; notes Khamenei’s statement that Iran has “no problem” with Jewish people; and describes sanctions and foreign military action as the true crimes against its population.

6. Suppression of Persian culture and identity: the evidence

Critics, including exiled Iranians and some scholars, say the Islamic Republic has suppressed Persian and pre-Islamic culture. The Iranian government rejects the framing and promotes Persian language and heritage in its own way. This section separates the clerical state as a whole, which makes and enforces these policies, from the IRGC, which is directly named in only some of the episodes below. Nothing here is a finding of a court, and most items rest on journalism, NGO reports or commentary rather than UN findings.

6.1 Pre-Islamic heritage and festivals

Nowruz is not banned. Encyclopaedia Iranica records that after 1979 some influential clerics tried to dampen public enthusiasm for Nowruz, but that this approach “was soon toned down” as the leadership sought to present the regime as “both religious and culturally proud of its ancient heritage.” (Encyclopaedia Iranica) Iran co-nominated Nowruz for UNESCO’s intangible heritage list, and UNESCO’s Intergovernmental Committee inscribed it in 2009. (UNESCO decision 4.COM 13.03) Iran International, an exile-based outlet, reports that Nowruz and Chaharshanbe Suri are “not officially banned,” but that hardliners call them “pagan,” and that authorities try to prevent gatherings at Persepolis and Pasargadae. (Iran International, Mar 2024)

Cyrus Day and heritage sites. Iran International reported in October 2024, citing the heritage-ministry-linked outlet Seday-e Miras, that security forces, fencing and concrete barriers were deployed at Pasargadae, and that access limits applied to Iranian citizens but not to foreign tourists. It reported that the state has “increasingly suppressed” pre-Islamic celebrations since 1979 and that restrictions had lasted at least a decade. (Iran International, Oct 2024) Kourosh Ziabari, writing for the Stimson Center in 2023, says authorities have used “arrests and periodic crackdowns” to stop the Tomb of Cyrus becoming a “secular pilgrimage destination.” He reports tiny heritage budgets (a minister called about 50 cents a day per site “a joke”) and notes rival explanations: clerical unease with Iranian nationalism, or simple neglect by a cash-strapped state. (Stimson Center) This is commentary, and the neglect claims are not UN or UNESCO findings.

Chaharshanbe Suri, 2026. Iran International reported that before the fire festival in March 2026, text messages, one reportedly from a provincial justice department, warned of imprisonment and flogging for “noise, commotion or unconventional behaviour,” and that IRGC spokesman Ali-Mohammad Naeini called it a “Charshanbeh of burning enemies,” saying “symbols of monarchists, separatist terrorists and mercenaries” would be set ablaze. The report says the festival has long drawn scrutiny from clerics, with enforcement by police, the Basij and vigilantes. (Iran International, Mar 2026) Single source: we found no second outlet we could open. The context was wartime and a call by exiled Prince Reza Pahlavi to celebrate, so the IRGC remarks were about security and politics, not a ban on the holiday. The Basij is part of the IRGC, per CFR and the FFMI.

State promotion. Iran’s minister of cultural heritage said in December 2024 that there is “no distinction between their Iranian identity and Islam,” and that Yalda and Chaharshanbe Suri are celebrated “alongside religious occasions like Ashura,” at a ceremony marking three years since Yalda’s UNESCO listing, as reported by Tehran Times. (Tehran Times) We found no source we could open that documents a Yalda-specific crackdown.

6.2 Language and ethnic minorities

Article 15 of the constitution makes Persian the official language and script, and allows “regional and tribal languages” in the press and media and for teaching their literature in schools “in addition to Persian.” Article 16 requires Arabic to be taught after primary school. (Constitute Project)

Amnesty International said in 2008 that “no permanent measures” had been introduced to teach in minority languages, despite the constitution, while noting that Kurdish is allowed in some broadcasts and publications and that Kurdish dress and music “are respected.” (Amnesty, 2008) That report is old. More recently, Iran International says the government “has never implemented” those provisions, that authorities crack down on unofficial mother-tongue classes, and that Kurdish group Kurdpa reported seven activists arrested over a year and sentenced to 16 years in total. It also notes President Pezeshkian, a native Torki and Kurdish speaker, has defended Article 15, and that critics argue non-Persian schooling could weaken national unity. (Iran International, Feb 2025)

The UN Special Rapporteur on Iran, Mai Sato, wrote in a March 2026 report that Kurds, Baloch, Arabs, Azerbaijanis and Turkmen face discrimination, that minority languages “remain suppressed in schools and public life,” and that state television reinforces ethnic stereotypes. She also described the degradation of the Hoor al-Azim wetland as harming Arab cultural identity and livelihoods. (A/HRC/61/59) Human Rights Watch reports “widespread and entrenched discrimination” against Ahwazi Arabs, Azerbaijani Turks, Baluchis, Kurds and Turkmen, and an appeal court upheld sentences for 10 Azerbaijani Turk activists in January 2025. (HRW World Report 2026) Freedom House cites “restrictions on the use of their languages.” (Freedom House)

6.3 Music, art and dress

In 2016 UN experts on cultural rights (Karima Bennoune) and freedom of expression (David Kaye) called the sentences of musicians Mehdi Rajabian and Yousef Emadi and filmmaker Hossein Rajabian “entirely unacceptable.” The three had been sentenced to six years (cut to three on appeal) for charges including “insulting Islamic sanctities.” The statement says Rajabian’s Barg Music, which distributed alternative music including by female singers, was “shut down by Revolutionary Guards in 2013.” (UN News, 2016) This is one of the few directly IRGC-attributed items we could verify. NPR reported in April 2025 that women are not permitted to perform alone on stage and that singers including Parastoo Ahmadi were arrested, in her case after a YouTube concert with her hair uncovered; she was released on bail. A former lawmaker said on state TV that women’s singing is not explicitly forbidden but that women are largely not permitted to sing in public. (NPR) NPR does not say which agency made the arrests.

On dress, HRW says authorities “maintained and enforced” compulsory hijab in 2025 and that the Hijab and Chastity law was suspended but not repealed. (HRW) The FFMI’s March 2026 paper noted the IRGC established so-called “ambassadors of kindness” to support monitoring of hijab compliance in public spaces, and described plans by a Tehran “Promotion of Virtue” headquarters for 80,000 “trained personnel.” (CRP.2, paras. 335 and fn. 609)

6.4 Where the IRGC is, and is not, implicated

  • Directly attributed in sources we opened: the 2013 closure of Barg Music (UN experts); the “ambassadors of kindness” hijab programme (FFMI); IRGC spokesman remarks on the 2026 fire festival (Iran International, single source); Basij as part of IRGC in street enforcement (Iran International, CFR).
  • State at large: constitutional language rules, education policy, heritage budgets, court sentences and censorship are decisions of the judiciary, ministries, parliament and the Supreme Leader’s system, and the sources above name those bodies or “authorities,” not the IRGC.
  • Not established: we found no verified source on an IRGC-linked cultural body running a campaign against Persian heritage, and no source we could open attributing specific arrests of artists or activists to the IRGC Intelligence Organisation.

Not included: reports we could not open (Hengaw, Minority Rights Group, NCRI, an MDPI paper on calendars) and unconfirmed claims about individual musicians’ sentences.

7. Ideology and “exporting the revolution”

This section sets out what Iranian and independent sources say about the IRGC’s ideological mission and the phrase “exporting the revolution.” None of the sources reviewed for this page supports a goal of forced conversion of non-Muslims or of the world, and this page does not claim one. The sources support something narrower: the constitution gives the IRGC an “ideological” role, Iranian leaders have at times spoken openly of “exporting” the revolution, and the Qods (Quds) Force has armed and trained allied groups abroad. Analysts disagree about how much of this is religious ideology and how much is security strategy.

7.1 What the constitution says

The preamble of Iran’s constitution, in the English text hosted by Constitute Project, says the Army and the IRGC “will be responsible not only for guarding and preserving the frontiers of the country, but also for fulfilling the ideological mission of jihad in God’s way; that is, extending the sovereignty of God’s law throughout the world.” The passage cites Qur’an 8:60 (“striking fear into the enemy of God and your enemy”). (Constitute Project)

Other articles point in two directions. Article 11 tells the government to work for “the political, economic, and cultural unity of the Islamic world.” Article 152 bases foreign policy on “the rejection of all forms of domination” and “the defence of the rights of all Muslims.” Article 154 says Iran “supports the just struggles of the mustad’afun against the mustakbirun in every corner of the globe” (the oppressed against the arrogant) “while scrupulously refraining from all forms of interference in the internal affairs of other nations.” (Constitute Project) The text does not mention conversion or define the means of “extending” God’s law. How the preamble and Article 154 fit together is a matter of interpretation, and this page offers none beyond the wording.

7.2 Khomeini and the IRGC in their own words

A translation of Ayatollah Khomeini’s New Year message of 1980, published by the Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP), quotes him as saying: “We should try hard to export our revolution to the world, and should set aside the thought that we do not export our revolution, because Islam does not regard various Islamic countries differently and is the supporter of all the oppressed people of the world.” In the same speech he says “we shall confront the world with our ideology,” in the context of standing up to the United States and the Soviet Union. (MERIP) MERIP does not name an author or translator for this English text.

Carnegie’s Afshon Ostovar quotes Khomeini in 1984 as saying “all the powers have risen against Islam and not against Iran,” and quotes a 1980 IRGC statement: “If our revolution does not have an internationalistic and aggressive worldview the enemies of Islam will once again enslave us culturally and politically.” (Ostovar, Carnegie 2016) We relied on Ostovar’s quotation and did not check his original sources. We could not open Khamenei.ir pages on what he means by “exporting” the revolution (the site blocked access), so we do not quote or paraphrase his definition.

7.3 The Quds Force, the “Axis of Resistance” and religious outreach

CFR says the Quds Force partners with Hamas and Hezbollah and that Tehran views its partner groups as an anti-West “axis of resistance.” In CFR’s words, “by fostering these groups, Tehran has sought to export its revolution and deter aggression,” though some groups “frequently operate independently of Iran.” (CFR) Ostovar describes Hezbollah as “the foremost example” of the IRGC cultivating a foreign ally “along shared political and religious lines,” says the IRGC trained Iraq’s Badr forces during the Iran–Iraq war, and notes Iran also backs the Sunni groups Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. (Ostovar) Crisis Group says Iran “helped establish Hizbollah” and calls the axis an alliance of Iran, Syria, Hizbollah and, “at times,” Hamas. (Crisis Group, 2018) On the Houthis, see the U.S. Treasury’s 2020 allegation that an IRGC-QF official supported efforts to provide them weapons and training (Treasury) and the AP’s September 2026 report, based on anonymous sources, in Section 4.4.

Al-Mustafa International University. The U.S. Treasury sanctioned this Qom-based institution on 8 December 2020, alleging the Quds Force uses it as “a recruitment platform” and that recruits were sent to fight in Syria with the Fatemiyoun and Zaynabiyoun militias. (Treasury) The university said it promotes “peace, friendship, and brotherhood among nations” and called the decision “hegemonic.” RFE/RL reported that researcher Ali Alfoneh found only three of 3,059 Iranian and allied fighters killed in Syria between 2012 and 2020 were students or graduates, which he said shows it was not the “primary recruitment ground.” (RFE/RL) Single-source points: the recruitment allegation rests on Treasury, and the Alfoneh figures on his own database as reported by RFE/RL. Al-Mustafa is a clerical-run network, and the allegation is that the Quds Force uses it, not that it is an IRGC unit. We opened no source on IRGC-run “cultural centres” abroad and make no claim about them.

7.4 Ideology or strategy? What analysts say

  • Security first (Ostovar, Carnegie, 2016): Iran’s foreign policy “is a product of its self-interest,” and the drive to protect the theocracy from external threats shapes it. Religion is “an inseparable component” of decision-making, but beliefs “influence” foreign policy without dictating it. Ostovar calls exporting the revolution an “unofficial policy” that, after Iraq’s 1980 invasion, Iran’s leaders came to see as essential to the revolution’s security. (Ostovar)
  • Both (Crisis Group, 2018): Leaders’ “first priority” is perpetuating the Islamic Republic, and “forward defence” is a security doctrine. The report says the broad stance “is not a subject of debate” because “both more pragmatic and more ideological elements deem it critical for national security.” Iran’s adversaries see a bid for hegemony, while Iranian strategists see an embattled state. (Crisis Group)
  • Pragmatism grows with time (Nasser Saghafi-Ameri, Middle East Institute): He says there were two Iranian views on exporting the revolution, one limited to culture and values and one of a vanguard for world liberation, and that the radical view was marginalized. Revolutionary governments, he argues, become more pragmatic as they mature. The MEI page is dated 2009 and reflects that period. (MEI)
  • Mixed drivers (Reisinezhad, LSE, 2026): An abstract of a British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies article says forward defence is shaped by geography and historical insecurity “in conjunction with its revolutionary ideology.” We read only the abstract. (LSE Research Online)

These views are not identical, and the weight of ideology versus strategy is disputed. We did not include a Wilson Center analysis because we did not open one.

7.5 Iran’s framing and its critics

Iran’s framing. Iranian officials and the constitution present support for groups abroad as defending Muslims and the oppressed against domination (Articles 152 and 154), and, per Crisis Group, Iranian strategists present forward defence as deterrence against stronger adversaries. Iran says it does not interfere in other states’ internal affairs, citing Article 154. The university says its work is educational. (Constitute Project; Crisis Group; RFE/RL)

Critics’ view. Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister, as quoted by Ostovar, cited Iran’s stated “objective of exporting the revolution” and its backing of Hezbollah, the Houthis and Iraqi militias as evidence, in Ostovar’s paraphrase, of a continuing sectarian agenda. Ostovar notes Iran’s backing of Shia groups “has most angered its neighbors.” (Ostovar) An ideological mission does not by itself establish the crimes alleged in Section 4, which rest on separate evidence.

8. Accountability routes

  • International Criminal Court (ICC): Under Articles 12 and 13 of the Rome Statute, the Court can act if the crime occurred on the territory of a State Party or the accused is a national of one, if a non-party lodges a declaration, or if the UN Security Council refers a situation. The UN Treaty Collection lists Iran’s signature on 31 December 2000 and no ratification date. We found no public ICC investigation concerning the IRGC in the sources reviewed;.
  • UN mechanisms: The FFMI, created 24 November 2022 and extended for two years by resolution S-39/1 on 23 January 2026, gives an oral update to the General Assembly in October 2026 and reports to the Council in 2027 and 2028. It is an investigative body, not a court. Rehman urged a standing international accountability mechanism; the FFMI urges states to use universal jurisdiction. (OHCHR; Council statement)
  • Universal jurisdiction: Sweden’s Nouri conviction is the leading example. On 16 December 2025 victims and the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center reportedly filed a complaint in Argentina against 40 Iranian officials, including IRGC members, over 2022 protest crimes; no outcome is reported in the sources reviewed. (CRP.2, para. 316)
  • International Court of Justice: The ICJ hears disputes between states. Article IX of the Genocide Convention allows any party to bring genocide disputes, subject to reservations we did not review. The only ICJ matter reviewed here involving IRGC conduct is the PS752 jurisdiction appeal, which addresses aviation law, not crimes against humanity.
  • National courts and sanctions: Domestic prosecutions include the Alinejad plot convictions in the U.S.; sanctions and terrorism-type listings are summarised in Section 2. These measures bring financial and criminal consequences for dealing with the IRGC but are executive decisions, not findings on genocide.
  • Pending next: The FFMI’s General Assembly update in October 2026, Iran’s ICJ reply due 21 October 2026, and further FFMI reports in 2027. Iran’s parliament is considering a bill the FFMI says could jail people for up to 30 years for “communicating” with foreign entities.

9. Timeline

DateEventSource
1979IRGC founded after the revolution.CFR
1981–82, 1988Mass executions of political prisoners; later described by a UN Special Rapporteur as crimes against humanity and genocide (disputed by Iran).OHCHR · BBC
25 Oct 2007U.S. designates the IRGC (E.O. 13382) and Qods Force (E.O. 13224).Treasury
Jun 2009Disputed election; alleged Basij attacks on protesters.CFR
8–15 Apr 2019U.S. FTO designation of the IRGC signed (8 Apr) and published (15 Apr).Federal Register
Nov 2019Nationwide fuel-price protests; at least 304 named dead per Amnesty.Amnesty
8 Jan 2020Flight PS752 shot down; Iran says in error.ICJ
14 Jul 2022Sweden convicts Hamid Nouri over 1988 executions.BBC
24 Nov 2022UN Human Rights Council creates the fact-finding mission on Iran.OHCHR
Mar 2024FFMI finds crimes against humanity in 2022–23 repression.Guardian
15 & 19 Jun 2024Nouri released in swap; Canada lists the IRGC.AP · CBC
22 Jul 2024Rehman says 1980s killings amounted to genocide; Iran rejects.VOA/AFP
Jun 2025Israel–Iran war; FFMI later documents effects on minorities and detainees.CRP.2
26 Aug 2025Australia expels Iran’s ambassador after ASIO attribution.BBC
27 Nov 2025Australia lists the IRGC as a state sponsor of terrorism.Australian Government
28 Dec 2025Nationwide protests begin.A/HRC/63/61
8–9 Jan 2026Deadliest days; internet shutdown from 8 January.UN Geneva
15 Jan 2026U.S. Treasury sanctions officials over the crackdown.Treasury
23 Jan 2026HRC special session; FFMI mandate extended two years.OHCHR
19 Feb 2026EU lists the IRGC as a terrorist organisation.EU Law Live
28 Feb 2026U.S.–Israeli strikes begin; Khamenei killed.CRP.2
8 Mar 2026Mojtaba Khamenei named Supreme Leader.BBC
17 Jul 2026UK designates the IRGC under State Threats Act.GOV.UK
17–21 Sep 2026FFMI report finds crimes against humanity by Iran and war-crime grounds against the U.S.; Council dialogue.OHCHR · Reuters
21 Oct 2026 (due)Iran’s reply due in the PS752 ICJ appeal.ICJ

10. Key sources and related coverage

Key sources and further reading

11. Note on method and status

This page is an independent explainer compiled from public sources; allegations are not findings of guilt. Last updated: Sep 30, 2026.

Method: claims are attributed to the named source. UN findings use the “reasonable grounds to believe” standard and are not court judgments. Figures from NGOs and governments are shown side by side rather than reconciled. Corrections are welcome and will be applied promptly.